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Summary of Election Analyses 
• Debt and deficits: The greatest challenge facing the next government is how to reduce 
the budget deficit and stabilise net public debt, which currently stands at £890 billion 
(£14,500 per person). No party has outlined more than £10 billion of spending cuts 
when cuts of £37 billion will be needed by 2014 to halve the deficit.  
• Getting and spending: Before the recession, Labour increased taxes (by 2.3% of GDP 
between 1997 and 2007) and spending (by 1.2% of GDP). The higher spending on 
police, education and hospitals has reduced crime and improved schools and 
healthcare – but public sector productivity has fallen. 
• Financial regulation: The roots of the global crisis lie in the financial sector where 
governments were forced to bail out banks deemed ‘too big to fail’. Bankruptcy risk 
must be made credible by reducing the systemic risk of large banks, for example, 
through steeply progressive taxes on bank size. 
• Inequality: Global forces such as technological change have pushed up inequality 
pressures. Labour’s policies have constrained the growth of inequality, but not 
reduced its level. The richest 10% have increased their share of income by £20 billion 
since 1998 – largely because of bankers’ bonuses. 
• Jobs: Since the recession began, unemployment has risen from 5% to 8% – far less 
than expected given the huge fall in GDP (over 6%). Unemployment rose faster for 
youths than adults, but this always happens in recessions. Although the New Deal has 
helped to contain unemployment, youth joblessness started rising from 2004 – four 
years before the recession began. 
• Education: A pupil premium for disadvantaged pupils would help raise standards. 
City academies and Swedish-style ‘free schools’ are unlikely to raise overall school 
performance. 
• Health: Since 1997, huge increases in NHS spending have helped reduce the 
inequality of health outcomes by social class. Reforms that increased competition 
improved hospital quality.  
• Crime: Crime has fallen since 1997, although 75% of people think it is rising. More 
police and targeting prolific offenders have helped reduce crime, as have improved 
opportunities at the lower end of the labour market. 
• Immigration: The proportion of immigrants of working age rose from 8% in 1995 to 
14% by 2009. Immigrants are less likely to be in social housing than the UK-born and 
are, on average, younger and better educated. 
• Urban renewal: There is no convincing evidence that area-based initiatives, such as 
the New Deal for Communities, have reduced differences between rich and poor 
areas.  
• Environment. In line with the Kyoto protocol, compared with 1990, UK emissions 
have been reduced by more than 12.5% since 1990. But the UK has failed to meet its 
own target of a 20% cut by 2010. To meet the targets efficiently, carbon prices must 
rise. 
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Immigration and the UK Labour Market: The Evidence from Economic Research 
 
• Immigration to the UK had been rising from 1995 to 2008. Inflows to the UK had 
been falling since 2006 and now the stock of immigrants has also fallen back. This is 
because immigration almost always falls during a recession.  
 
• By late 2009, 14% of the UK’s working age population had been born abroad, up 
from around 8% in 1995. There are now 5.3 million adults of working age in the UK 
who were born abroad. 
 
• The UK has a lower share of immigrants in its total population (10.2%) than Australia 
(25%), Germany (12.9%) or the United States (13.6%). 
 
• Immigrants are arriving from many more countries than in the past. Poland, India and 
Pakistan are now the countries that contribute the biggest proportion of new arrivals, 
followed by South Africa and the United States. 
 
• Compared with the UK-born, immigrants are younger and better educated. The most 
recent immigrants are even more educated. Immigrants are concentrated in London. 
About 60% of Brent’s working age population was born overseas compared with 
under 3% in Knowsley.  
 
• Aside from arrivals from other members of the European Union (EU), the number of 
new immigrants who are allowed to work in the UK is now controlled by the 
government through a ‘points’ system.  
 
• Immigrants, on average, are less likely to be in social housing than people born in the 
UK, even when the immigrant is from a developing country. Only immigrants who 
became UK citizens are neither more nor less likely to be in social housing than UK-
born individuals. 
 
• There are potential economic benefits associated with migration, especially to fill 
gaps in the UK labour market – where there are shortages of workers, whether high- 
or low-skilled. While there may be costs to particular groups, there is little evidence 
of an overall negative impact on jobs or wages. 
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Introduction  
 
There is little doubt that the share of immigrants in the UK’s working age population is now 
higher than in the past (see Figure 1). Fifteen years of rising immigration between 1993 and 
2008 means that there are now 6.8 million individuals (and 5.3 million adults of working age) 
living in the UK who were born abroad, up from 2.9 million in total (and 2.3 million of 
working age) in 1979. 
 
Over the same period, the UK-born population grew from 52 million to 54.2 million (and 
from 30.3 million to 32.7 million of working age). 
 
Since the fourth quarter of 2008, there has been a decline in the stock of immigrants living in 
the UK (see Figure 1). Just as happened in previous economic downturns, part of the 
explanation may be the onset of the latest recession. 
 
The stock of immigrants is affected by both the size of inflows and the duration of stay, 
which in turn is related to the number of outflows of immigrants. Data on inflows come from 
two sources: the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the International Passenger Survey (IPS).  
 
According to the LFS, the inflow rate of immigrants into the UK has been falling since 2006. 
According to the IPS, immigrant inflow numbers have been broadly stable from 2006 to 
2009. Moreover, net annual inflows (inflows minus outflows) have been on a downward 
trend since 2007, from a peak of over 200,000 to the current level of 147,000.1 
 
At the same time, there has been a fall in the number of new asylum-seekers. These people 
form a group that is distinct from immigrants: asylum-seekers cannot legally work until their 
application has been granted. Asylum applications rose from 32,500 in 1997 to reach a peak 
of 84,130 in 2002 before falling back to 24,000 in 2009.  
 
The stock of immigrants in the UK is influenced both by the UK’s economic performance 
relative to other countries and by immigration policy. Just as in Canada and Australia, the UK 
now has a points-based immigration system, which seeks to restrict immigration from outside 
the European Union (EU) to skilled individuals. In practice, the number of arrivals who come 
from outside the EU to study or for family reunion every year still exceeds those arriving for 
work-related reasons.  
 
Immigration has risen in almost all industrialised countries over the past decade, where the 
average share of immigrants in the population has increased from 10.7% to 13.8% between 
1998 and 2007.2 Spain, Austria, Ireland and the United States have all experienced similar-
sized proportionate increases in immigration in recent years. 
 
The UK is still a middle-ranking country in terms of how many immigrants live here. The 
OECD’s internationally comparable figures for 2007 indicate that 10.2% of the UK’s total 
population was foreign-born. This is below countries like Canada (20.1%), Germany (13%), 
the Netherlands (10.7%) and Sweden (13.4%).3 
                                                 
1 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/mig0210.pdf.  
2 OECD, International Migration Outlook 2009. 
3 OECD, International Migration Outlook 2006. 
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Figure 1: The share of immigrants in the UK’s working age population 
 
A. Long run – percentage of immigrants in working age population, 1979q2-2009q2  
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B. Short run – percentage of immigrants in working age population, 2000q1-2009q4 
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Source: Labour Force Survey. 
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Which countries do immigrants come from?  
Table 1 shows the country of origin of the top five ‘sender’ countries in 2009 for the stock of 
existing immigrants and the flow of new immigrants. Many new immigrants – those who 
have been in the country for less than a year – are not primarily from the poorest countries, 
but from developed countries or wealthier emerging countries like South Africa. 
 
The sender countries are much less concentrated than in the past. Twenty years ago, one 
third of all immigrants came from just two countries, Ireland and India. Now these two 
countries account for just 12% of all immigrants. The top three sender countries for the new 
arrivals to the UK in 2009 were Poland, India and Pakistan.  
 
Table 1: Country of origin of immigrants to the UK (percentage share in brackets) 
Largest senders  1985 2009 
All immigrants   
1 Ireland (16.5%)  India (10.7%) 
2 India (13.5%) Poland (7.9%) 
3 Pakistan (6.9%) Pakistan (7.2%) 
4 Jamaica (5.1%) Germany (5.1%) 
5 Germany (4.6%) South Africa (3.4%) 
New immigrants  
(arrived in last year) 
  
1 United States (20.6%)  India (11.4%) 
2 Ireland (10.6%) Poland (8.9%) 
3 India (5.2%) United States (5.6%) 
4 Pakistan (4.1%) South Africa (3.9%) 
5 Germany (3.9%) France (3.5%) 
Source: Labour Force Survey. 
 
Where do immigrants settle?  
While the stock of immigrants has risen in all regions over time, it has risen most in London. 
Although there is some evidence to suggest that new immigrants are more regionally 
dispersed than in the past, immigrants constituted 39% of London’s population in 2009 (see 
Figure 2). 
 
The geographical dispersion of immigrant share across local areas is much larger. Around 
60% of the working age populations of Brent and Westminster were born overseas 
compared with less than 3% of the populations of Knowsley or Redcar & Cleveland. 
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Figure 2: Immigrant share of regions’ working age populations 
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Source: Labour Force Survey. 
Note: LO=London, WMM=West Midlands Met., GM=Greater Manchester, SE=South East, EA=East Anglia, 
WY=West Yorkshire, EM=East Midlands, SW=South West, TW=Tyne & Wear, NW=North West, 
SC=Scotland, SY=South Yorkshire, WM=Rest of West Midlands, NI=Northern Ireland, NY=North Yorkshire, 
WA=Wales, ME=Merseyside, NO=North of England 
 
What skills do immigrants have? 
Immigrants are, on average, more educated than their UK-born counterparts, and the 
educational attainment gap has been rising over time since more recent immigrants are more 
educated, on average, than other immigrants (see Table 2). 
 
While more than half of the UK-born workforce left school at 16 or earlier, fewer than one in 
six new immigrants finished their education by the age of 16. Just under one in five UK-born 
members of the workforce finished education at 21 or later compared with more than one in 
three immigrants and more than 50% of all new immigrants. 
 
Table 2: Education and immigrant status (working age population), 2009 
 Percentage of group with each level of education 
Age finished education UK-born All immigrants New immigrants 
    
16 or under 53.1% 24.8% 15.4% 
17-20 28.2% 36.5% 34.0% 
21 or older 18.7% 38.7% 50.6 
Source: Labour Force Survey. 
 
Education partly reflects immigrants’ occupation and industry. There is a larger share of 
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immigrants than UK-born working in professional occupations. But there are more 
immigrants, particularly new immigrants, in the elementary occupations (such as bar work 
and waiters) than might be expected given their qualifications (see Table 3).The hotel and 
restaurant sectors employ relatively more migrant workers than other sectors. The agriculture 
and energy sectors employ relatively fewer migrant workers than other sectors (see Table 4). 
 
Table 3: Occupational distribution of immigrants and UK-born, 2009 
 Percentage of group in each occupation 
 UK-born All immigrants New immigrants 
Managerial 16.4% 12.6%  8.7% 
Professional 13.1% 16.5% 18.9% 
Assistant professional 14.7% 14.2%  8.7% 
Administrative 11.6%  8.3%  5.7% 
Skilled trades 10.8%  9.1%  8.3% 
Personal service  8.8%  8.7% 11.0% 
Sales  7.4%  6.5%  7.6% 
Processing  6.9%  8.5% 2.7% 
Elementary occupations 10.4% 15.7% 28.4% 
Source: Labour Force Survey. 
 
Table 4: Industrial distribution of immigrants and UK-born, 2009 
 Percentage of immigrants in each industry 
 All immigrants New immigrants 
Agriculture 6.3% 0.2% 
Manufacturing 11.1% 0.5% 
Energy  6.7% 0.1% 
Construction  8.3% 0.2% 
Retail 11.0% 0.5% 
Hotels and restaurants 22.7% 2.0% 
Transport 14.7% 0.3% 
Finance 13.3% 0.8% 
Public administration  7.8% 0.2% 
Education  9.2% 0.3% 
Health 14.1% 0.5% 
Other  8.6% 0.4% 
Source: Labour Force Survey. 
 
 
Some costs and benefits of immigration 
 
There are many potential benefits of allowing the mobility of labour across international 
borders, just as there are benefits from the trade of goods, services and capital.  
 
First, economic immigrants can ease shortages in the job market. Until 2008, the UK had a 
buoyant labour market and still has relatively low unemployment. There remain labour 
shortages in some areas such as the high turnover retail and hospitality sectors and high 
demand for very skilled workers as indicated by the growth in the wage premium for 
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people with a university education since 1980 despite large increases in the number of 
university graduates. 
 
Second, immigrants are typically younger than average, which can help with filling 
particular niches and balancing the generational gap in financing pension provision. 
 
Although immigration will help keep the economy growing through the provision of goods 
and services that may not have been produced in the absence of immigration, there may be 
costs for particular groups. Simple economic analysis predicts that immigration may put 
downward pressure on the wages of workers who are in direct competition with immigrants.  
 
Equally there may be costs to increased immigration if there is increased pressure on housing, 
health and welfare services. 
 
Unlike in the United States, where the skill composition of immigrants is tilted towards the 
unskilled, the skill composition of immigrants to the UK is more biased towards skilled 
workers.4 It might be expected therefore that there would be more pressure on wages among 
skilled workers in the UK, unless immigrants look for jobs that are not commensurate with 
their skills or it is harder to transfer certain acquired skills from one country to another.  
 
Furthermore, if demand for labour is rising, there may be no effects of immigration on 
wages and employment. An open economy may adjust by means other than wages: one such 
mechanism is adjustment by changing the mix of goods the economy produces. 
 
A recent study of the fiscal impact of immigration of workers from the eight EU accession 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (the A8) concludes that because this group of 
immigrants are more likely to be in work and make less use of welfare and other public 
services, their net contribution is positive.5 
 
 
What is the evidence on the labour market benefits and costs of immigration?  
 
As ever, it is useful to consider the evidence rather than rely on perceptions about the 
effects of immigration. Recent empirical research on the labour market effects of 
immigration to the UK finds little evidence of overall adverse effects of immigration on 
wages and employment for people born in the UK.6 
 
Nevertheless, there may be some downward pressure in the low wage labour market where 
(despite their higher relative education levels) many new immigrants tend to find work. 
There may also be a positive effect on wages in the high wage labour markets where it may 
take more time for the skills that immigrants bring to transfer.7 
 
Population pressures 
There has been some concern that rising immigration puts extra pressure on schools and on 
the housing market. These are areas in which there is still little hard evidence. 
 
                                                 
4 Dustmann et al (2005). 
5 Dustmann et al (2009). 
6 Manacorda et al (2007). 
7 Dustman et al (2007). 
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Figure 3 compares the numbers of immigrants in each age group with the numbers of UK-
born individuals in the same age group. Since most immigrants to the UK arrive as young 
adults, there are few children among the stock of immigrants and hence the numbers of 
children born abroad are small compared with the numbers of children born in the UK, 
which have also been declining because of a falling birth rate.  
 
Together these demographic pressures on schooling resources should, on average, be 
small. But there may be more pressure in a few areas of the country, such as London, 
where immigration is concentrated. In 2009, more than one quarter of all 25-30 year olds 
(and 55% of all 25-30 year olds living in London) had been born abroad. 
 
Figure 3: Numbers of immigrants by age group, 2009 (men and women), thousands  
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Source: Labour Force Survey. 
 
Housing 
Concerns have also been raised that rising immigration may be putting pressure on the 
housing system. Any increase in population means increased demand for housing services 
and if supply does not meet demand, this could lead to rising prices or increased queues for 
social housing. 
 
There is, as yet, no evidence of the effect of immigration on house prices and rents, though 
we do know that immigrants are much less likely to be in owner occupation and much more 
likely to be in private rental accommodation (see Table 5).  
 
With regard to social housing, new immigrants from outside the EU have no entitlement to 
social housing. Entitlement depends on citizenship, which in turn depends on years of 
residency in the UK, and then household needs. 
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Table 5 summarises the percentage point differences in the effect of immigrant status relative 
to UK-born individuals on the chances of being in social housing accommodation after 
controlling for age, qualifications, labour force status, marital status, number of children and 
region of residence. Table 5 also gives estimates for all immigrants and then for different 
groups of immigrants – immigrants who are now UK citizens, EU citizens, immigrants from 
the OECD and other immigrants. 
 
Table 5: Immigration and housing tenure 
 Percentage point difference relative to UK-born individuals, 
net of controls 
 Owner occupation Private rental Social housing 
    
All immigrants -38 +43 -5 
Effect of one extra year in the 
UK 
+1 -1 + 0.1 
    
Of which:    
UK citizens +6 -6 0 
EU citizens -27 +33 -6 
OECD immigrants +4 +4 -8 
Other immigrants -19 +21 -2 
Source: Annual Population Survey 2008, Population of Working Age. 
 
The column on social housing shows that immigrants, on average, are 5 percentage points 
less likely to be in social housing on arrival. Thereafter, the chances of being observed in 
social housing rise by around 0.08 percentage points each year. A positive effect of years of 
residence is to be expected, since this is correlated with residency conditions and increased 
entitlement to welfare services. 
 
Overall this suggests that immigrants are, on average, less likely to be in social housing. 
Disaggregating the stock of immigrants by country of origin, Table 5 shows that immigrants 
from the EU, from the OECD and other immigrants are all less likely to be in social housing. 
Only immigrants who became UK citizens are neither more nor less likely to be in social 
housing than UK-born individuals. 
 
How do immigrants fare in the labour market?  
For policy purposes, it is important to know whether immigrants benefit from economic 
conditions in the host country and, if so, how quickly they adapt and how this adaptation 
process changes with time or across policy regimes. The evidence suggests that over time, 
relative wage and employment prospects for immigrants to the United States appear to have 
deteriorated in a way that is not as apparent in the UK.8 
 
Equally, there appear to be very few wage and employment effects of rising immigration on 
UK-born workers, on average. There are some hints in the data, that immigrants can put some 
downward pressure on the employment and job prospects of some of the less skilled.9  
 
                                                 
8 Schmitt and Wadsworth (2007). 
9 Dustmann et al (2008). 
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There is now very little difference between the employment rates of immigrant and UK-born 
men. Historically the employment gap has widened in recessions and narrowed in economic 
recoveries. This has not been observed during the latest recession. Unemployment rates for 
immigrants and UK-born have risen together by similar amounts (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: Unemployment for immigrants and UK-born men 
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Source: Labour Force Survey. 
 
In 2009, 81% of working age immigrant men had jobs compared with 79% of working age 
UK-born men (excluding students). Immigrant males are, on average, a little more likely to 
be unemployed but less likely to be economically inactive.  
 
The higher average unemployment rate of immigrants was explained in part by the fact that 
many of them were employed in casual and insecure jobs: anyone who is in this sort of job 
faces much higher risks of subsequent unemployment. New immigrants cannot claim state 
benefits unless they are working or have paid sufficient contributions when in work.  
 
Labour market performance is strongly influenced by age and education, which are factors 
that also determine the chances of coming to live in the UK. Table 6 gives a sense of the 
extent to which country of origin differences in employment rates can be accounted for by 
differences in age and education. 
 
Among men, many immigrant groups have higher employment rates than UK-born men. 
Differences in age and educational attainment can account for much of the better relative 
employment performance among Indian immigrants and immigrants from the OECD, but not 
immigrants from elsewhere. 
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Table 6: Differences in employment rates between immigrants and UK born  
 Percentage point difference in 2009 employment rate compared with 
UK-born 
 Men Women 
 No controls Controls for age 
and education 
No controls Controls for age 
and education 
     
India +4.4 0 -15.1 -14.2 
Pakistan -6.6 -6.5 -54.5 -41.5 
Bangladesh -9.0 -9.3 -56.2 -42.6 
A8 accession +12.8 +10.7 0 +4.8 
Other EU  +4.0 +2.5 0 -3.8 
OECD +7.0 0 0 -5.7 
Other immigrants -2.5 -5.9 -12.0 -12.3 
Source: Labour Force Survey. 
 
Among women, there are much lower employment rates for some immigrant communities 
compared with UK-born women. Age and education can account for around one quarter of 
these differences among women born in Pakistan and Bangladesh, but more research is 
needed to understand the reasons for these differences. 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
During periods of strong economic growth, migration is and has always been important for 
filling gaps in the labour market. On balance, the evidence for the UK labour market suggests 
that fears over the consequences of rising immigration have been exaggerated. It is hard to 
find evidence of much displacement of UK workers or lower wages, on average. Immigrants, 
especially in recent years, tend to be younger and better educated than the UK-born and are 
less likely to be unemployed. They certainly do not receive preferential access to housing. 
 
But there have been some effects. The less skilled may have experienced greater downward 
pressure on wages and greater competition for jobs than others, but these effects still appear 
to have been relatively modest. Unfortunately we don’t know much about whether the effects 
of immigration are different in downturns. We also need to understand more about how 
capital and sectoral shifts in demand respond to immigration over the longer run. 
 
Future migration trends will, as ever, depend on relative economic performance and 
opportunity. But we still need to know more about the effects of rising immigration beyond 
the labour market in areas like prices, housing, health, crime and welfare.  
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Reducing Crime: More Police, More Prisons or More Pay? 
 
• Just over 4.7 million crimes were recorded by the police force of England and 
Wales in 2008/09, of which 72% were property crimes and 21% were violent 
crimes.  
 
• The British Crime Survey, which asks consistent questions over time, shows 
that overall crimes committed have fallen by almost half since 1997.  
 
• Overall recorded crime has also fallen since the early 1990s. The introduction 
of better recording practices in 1997 and 2002, however, make it difficult to 
assess recent trends in violent crime although it has clearly been decreasing in 
the past five years. 
  
• Despite this fall in crime rates, three quarters of the public still think the 
national picture is worsening.  
 
• Several crime-fighting strategies work. First, increases in police numbers, 
combined with new policing strategies such as the Street Crime Initiative, 
have reduced robberies. Second, targeting prolific offenders is an effective 
tool for reducing crime. Third, recent evidence suggests that early release on 
electronic monitoring helps reduce recidivism rates of ex-prisoners.  
 
• There is no clear evidence that the large increase in locking people up has 
reduced crime, especially in terms of its long-term impact on offending 
behaviours.  
 
• Poor education and bad labour market opportunities are associated with higher 
levels of crime. Government policies aimed at improving education and 
‘making work pay’ can have indirect effects on crime reduction. 
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Introduction 
 
Crime is usually high on the list of voter concerns. This might seem surprising since 
total crime has fallen significantly since the mid-1990s. Yet three quarters of the 
population think that crime is rising nationally.1 Politicians must take account of the 
public’s false perception of increasing levels of crime, which seems to be sustained 
even in years when both recorded crime and victimisation surveys point to reductions 
in overall crime. 
The total economic and social cost of crime was estimated to be just above £35 billion 
by the Home Office for 2003/04, the latest year for which figures are available.2 
All the political parties promise to be ‘tough on crime’ and to protect central police 
funding from cuts. The opposition parties also stress freeing up police time spent on 
administrative ‘red tape’. The Conservatives promise to increase the number and 
length of custodial sentences, while the Liberal Democrats put the emphasis on 
rehabilitation. The Labour government likes to highlight policies to tackle economic 
and social deprivation.  
This Election Analysis describes crime trends and research evidence relevant to the 
parties’ proposed policies. 
 
 
What has happened to crime over time? 
 
The police recorded just over 4.7 million crimes in England and Wales between April 
2008 and March 2009. The three main types of property crimes – theft and handling, 
burglaries and criminal damage – account for 68% of the total; while violent crimes – 
sexual offences, violence against the person and robbery – account for a little more 
than 20% of all recorded crimes (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Recorded crime categories 2008/09 
 
Source: Crime in England and Wales 2008/09 
                                                 
1 This is on a par with what the public thought in 1996. But the proportion of people who think crime is 
getting worse at their local area has decreased from 55% to 36% over the same period (Crime in 
England and Wales 2008/09). 
2 Dubourg et al (2005). 
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There has been a clear reduction in recorded property crime since it peaked in the 
early 1990s (see Figure 2). The introduction of two successive police recording 
practice changes in 1998/99 and 2002/03 makes it harder to compare what has 
happened since Labour came to power. 
The two change years are highlighted in Figure 2 with vertical lines and show that the 
earlier changes strongly affected violent crime, which now includes some previously 
unrecorded categories. In recent years though, both property and violent recorded 
crimes appear to have been decreasing, despite the recording rule adjustments. 
 
Figure 2: Recorded crime trends 1983-2009 
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Source: Recorded Crime Statistics 1983/84-2002/03 
(http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/100years.xls) and Crime in England and Wales 2008/09 
(http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs07/hosb1107chap2.xls)  
Note: vertical lines denote a break in the series 
 
The British Crime Survey (BCS) is better for looking at trends, as it was not affected 
by the recording practice changes. This victimisation survey also offers a useful 
counterpoint to administrative crime data to get a better picture of offences committed 
but possibly not recorded. This gap is very important as Table 1 shows: only a quarter 
of comparable violent crimes and two thirds of property crimes were recorded in 
1997.  
Overall the number of crimes committed since 1997 appears to have fallen by almost 
half – from 6.3 million in 1997 to only 3.3 million in 2008. The fall in 1997-2002 was 
faster for property crime than violent crime, but after 2002, both types of crime have 
fallen by about a quarter.  
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Table 1: Comparing committed crimes (British Crime Survey), recorded crimes and 
changes in the fear of crime over time 
 
Source: Crime in England and Wales 2008/09 – the ‘all comparable property crime’ category includes 
burglary, all vehicle thefts (excluding interference and tempering), bicycle theft and theft from the 
person; the ‘all comparable violent crime’ includes less serious wounding and robbery. Worry about 
property crime is based on burglaries and vehicle crime; worry about violent crime is based on all 
violent crimes. Note that there are breaks in series for recorded crime (see below). 
 
Trends in recorded crime are harder to judge because of improvements in the way 
crime is measured, as noted above. For example, only 25% of violent crimes 
committed were recorded in 1997, but 70% were recorded in 2008. Thus, although 
recorded violent crime appears to have increased (as committed crimes fell), this is 
due to changes in reporting and is therefore misleading3. Consistent with this 
interpretation, the proportion of people who say they are very worried about crime has 
also fallen by around 10% since 1997, even for violent crime. 
 
 
Reducing crime: more police? 
 
Since 1997, a net total of 17,000 extra police have been hired. There is a strong public 
perception that more police makes a society safer. But the impact of increasing police 
on reducing crime is hard to unravel: if more police are hired to combat crime, then 
crime may appear to be higher when there are greater numbers of police.  
Examination of the Street Crime Initiative in 2002 suggests that more police resources 
can significantly reduce crime.4 This policy allocated extra funds5 to 10 of the 43 
police force areas of England and Wales with a remit to use the funds to try to combat 
robbery. Because the Street Crime Initiative was introduced in certain areas and not in 
                                                 
3 Although the last change was in 2002, it seems that it took some time before the Home Office 
systems fully adjusted, so some of the apparent rise post 2002 is likely still linked to this change. 
4 Machin and Marie (2005). 
5 Just under £50 million over two years, mainly spent on police staffing. 
 
1997 2002 2008 
Percentage 
change 
1997-2008 
 All comparable property crime 
Crimes recorded by the police 
(thousands)  2,330 2,080 1,391 - 40% 
Estimate of crimes committed 
(thousands)  6,294 4,435 3,270 -48% 
Percentage of crimes recorded 37% 47% 43% +6% 
Percentage very worried about 
crime  21% 16% 12% -9% 
 All comparable violent crime 
Crimes recorded by the police 
(thousands)  290 330 515 +78% 
Estimate of crimes committed 
(thousands)  1,138 1,003 738 - 35% 
Percentage of crimes recorded 25% 33% 70% +45% 
Percentage very worried about 
crime  25% 22% 15% -10% 
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others, it is possible to compare what happened to robberies before and after the 
introduction across areas. 
The research finds that these extra police resources did have a strong impact, reducing 
robberies by about 20%. The initiative was highly cost-effective with a net social 
benefit estimated at between £100 and £170 million a year. Key to this outcome 
seems to be a combination of extra manpower with the introduction of innovative 
police practices such as greater and more systematic inter-agency co-operation. 
 
 
Reducing crime: more prisons? 
 
In December 2009, there were just over 84,000 individuals in custody in England and 
Wales, which represents 153 prisoners per 100,000 members of the population. The 
prison population has almost doubled in 20 years and the incarceration rate is 60% 
higher than that in France or Germany.  
 
 
Figure 3: Changes in prison population and recorded crime 1989-2009 
Source: Offender Management Caseload Statistics 2008, Recorded Crime Statistics 1989-2002/03, and 
Crime in England and Wales 2008/09 
 
Imprisonment can reduce crime through two channels. First, as offenders are in 
custody, they are removed from the street and unable to commit other crimes – the 
‘incapacitation effect’. Second, the increased threat of punishment deters potential 
criminals from committing offences.  
Figure 3 plots changes in prison population against changes in recorded crime. 
Although crime does appear to decrease when incarceration levels increase, there may 
be other factors driving both outcomes. 
These figures also ignore re-offending rates, which may be better measures of the 
effectiveness of prison, especially in comparison with rehabilitation programmes. 
Recent research has, for example, shown that a large early release scheme in England 
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and Wales (Home Detention Curfews) was successful in significantly reducing re-
offending rates.6  
There is also evidence that targeting and monitoring individuals who are responsible 
for committing large volumes of offences in their communities can reduce crime.7 
Examination of the effect of early introduction of the Prolific Offender Strategy in 
certain areas of the UK before it was rolled out in 2004 indicates that it had a 
substantial impact in reducing burglaries, the crime these type of offenders are most 
likely to commit. 
 
 
Reducing crime: the impact of education and labour market policies 
 
A large body of evidence suggests that education and labour market opportunities 
influence criminal activity. Someone with a poor education and bleak labour market 
opportunities is more likely to commit a crime. This may be because, for property 
crimes, the potential financial gains outweigh the risks. 
Most research findings point to a strong impact of economic conditions, in particular 
income inequalities, on crime. For example, in the 1980s, there were larger increases 
in crime in areas where low wages deteriorated most strongly.8 The introduction of 
the national minimum wage in 1999 also appears to have reduced crime by improving 
the relative pay of the worst off workers.9 By contrast, the relationship between crime 
and unemployment is more uncertain.10 
Labour market policies are also potentially important for crime since they have the 
potential to alter economic incentives. Machin and Marie (2004) study the 
introduction of more stringent unemployment benefit requirements with the 1996 
introduction of the Jobseeker’s Allowance. There was a substantial drop in 
unemployment, but some of these individuals dropped out of the labour market and 
shifted into criminal activities.  
Research also shows that improved education opportunities can reduce crime. Since 
the UK has one of the lowest post-compulsory participation rates in education in 
Western Europe, this could well be linked to higher crime rates for 16 to 18 years 
olds. There is research evidence that increases in the school leaving age in England 
and Wales (in 1947 and 1972) has had important long-term crime reduction effects.11 
The Labour government has introduced the Education Maintenance Allowance, which 
pays low-income pupils to stay in school, and this policy has had some success in 
improving their staying on rates.12 An additional benefit is that in areas where the 
allowance was first introduced, juvenile property crime rates fell by more than in 
areas where it had not yet been introduced.13 
Improving people’s education opportunities therefore emerges as an important crime 
reduction policy. This works in two ways: first, by reducing crime by increasing 
                                                 
6 Marie (2009). 
7 Machin and Marie (2007). 
8 Machin and Meghir (2004). 
9 Hansen and Machin (2002) 
10 Freeman (1999), Machin and Marie (2004). 
11 Machin et al (2010). 
12 Dearden et al (2009). 
13 Feinstein and Sabates (2005). 
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people’s potential future income; and second, by reducing crime participation while 
individuals stay involved in the education system.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Total crimes committed have significantly fallen under the Labour government. This 
is due to important reductions in property crimes, which represent the majority of 
offences committed. Fear of crime has also receded in lockstep with this. 
The apparent increase in recorded crime for serious offences is due to improvements 
in the way that crime is recorded by the police – 70% of serious crimes committed 
were recorded in 2008 compared with only 25% in 1997. Thus, looking at trends in 
recorded crime is highly misleading. 
One central crime-fighting election pledge from all parties is to keep central police 
funding at least at its current level. Recent research shows that spending on police 
resources does reduce certain types of crime when linked to the introduction of new 
police practices. Improving the education and labour market position of the unskilled 
can also help, especially in the long run.  
There is less evidence to support the proposal to increase the prison population so as 
to reduce crime, although certain early release packages appear to reduce re-offending 
behaviour successfully. Recent research also finds that targeting prolific offenders 
does reduce the rate of crimes they are most likely to commit in their community. 
High income inequality and low education opportunities have emerged as important 
factors explaining the causes of crime. Certain policies introduced by the Labour 
government to tackle those causes appear to have had an indirect beneficial effect of 
reducing crime rates.  
 
 
April 2010 
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ELECTION ANALYSIS 
 
 
Evaluating Education Policies: The Evidence from Economic Research 
 
• Educational expenditure in the UK has increased enormously – but it is still only just 
above the OECD average. In 1997/98, expenditure on education and training as a 
percentage of GDP was 4.9% (the same level as in 1987/88) whereas in 2006, it was 
5.9% of GDP. There is robust evidence that the increase in school expenditure 
between 2002 and 2007 led to a modest increase in educational attainment. 
 
• Exam performance has improved over time for secondary schools. But the 
improvement in primary schools since 2000 has been more muted. Exam performance 
has improved at a faster rate for poorer pupils, although the gap between rich and poor 
pupils is still substantial. 
 
• A ‘pupil premium’ that would follow disadvantaged pupils would help to correct 
inequities in how funding gets allocated to schools. Research evidence suggests that 
economically disadvantaged pupils benefit disproportionately from rises in general 
school expenditure. 
 
• Early evidence on the effects of the academies programme suggests that the growth in 
educational attainment for pupils attending academies is no different than for pupils 
attending other similar schools. Evidence for Sweden does not suggest that the 
application of a similar system in the UK would raise overall educational attainment. 
 
• Increasing the entry-level qualifications for teachers is a difficult challenge in view of 
the high labour market returns available to graduates and the continuing need for 
more teachers to replace those who leave the profession. Research evidence suggests 
that ‘teacher quality’ is important for their pupils’ results, but it does not suggest that 
there is a relationship between ‘teacher quality’ and teachers’ own educational 
credentials. 
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Introduction 
 
Education is a top issue on the agenda for all political parties. This Election Analysis gives an 
overview of key issues that are likely to be important in the election campaign.  
 
 
How is England performing? 
 
Educational performance has improved since 1997 and moved England up the 
international league tables for secondary school pupils.  
 
Educational performance in England is usually measured by the percentage of pupils 
attaining five or more GCSEs at grades A*-C at the end of compulsory schooling. With 
regard to primary education, the indicator is the percentage of pupils achieving the required 
standard (as defined by the National Curriculum) at the end of key stage 2. Both measures 
suggest massive improvement over time (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Improvements in educational achievements 
 
 
But critics allege that grade inflation, ‘teaching to the test’ and attempts by schools to 
manipulate their performance (for example, by encouraging pupils to take easier subjects) can 
account for a lot of this improvement. A different criticism is that roughly a fifth of primary 
school children still do not achieve the required standard by the end of primary school despite 
the improvements. All this prompts people to look at how England performs internationally.  
There are three international tests of relevance here: Progress in International Reading 
Literacy (PIRLS), conducted in 2001 and 2006 for pupils of about 10 years old; the 
Programme for the International Student Assessment (PISA), conducted in 2000, 2003 and 
2006 for 15 year olds; and Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), 
conducted in 1999, 2003 and 2007 for pupils of about age 10 and age 14 (that is, years 5 and 
9 in England). 
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Take first the surveys for secondary school pupils. TIMSS is more curriculum-based and 
closer to what is measured in national key stage tests. PISA measures the application of 
knowledge in everyday situations. 
The latest PISA suggests that scores for England are close to the OECD average. But PISA 
should not be used to measure change over time because of problems with the English entry 
in both 2000 and 2003.1 
In TIMSS, England is one of the top performers and there has been a significant increase in 
test scores over time. Hence, TIMSS suggests that the improvement over time in national 
tests is not just an artefact of grade inflation. But the fact that England is only an average 
performer on PISA should guard against any complacency about educational standards. 
The latest PIRLS study shows that England is significantly above the international average 
for the reading abilities of 10 year olds. But this is below some major European countries 
(including Italy and Germany) and there has been a decline in performance since 2001. 
As explained by Twist et al (2006), the change over time is sensitive to the methodology for 
linking data. Their alternative methodology suggests that the fall over time might be smaller 
than what appears in the main study. But even in the national data, it is hard to see evidence 
for much improvement in this particular time period. 
Taken together the evidence suggests that any improvement in primary school achievement 
since 2000 has been modest, at best. 
Of course, one of the biggest issues in UK education policy is its role (or potential role) in 
influencing social mobility. The lack of social mobility in the UK is well-known and is 
reflected partly in the strong relationship between poverty and educational attainment. 
Figure 2 shows that educational attainment at GCSE (measured at school level) is strongly 
related to schools’ concentration of poor pupils (as measured by eligibility to receive free 
school meals). But the relationship is weaker than it was back in 1997 because of catching up 
among schools serving poor pupils. A similar phenomenon is found at pupil level for 2003/04 
to 2008/09.2  
 
                                                            
1 England did not meet the OECD school response rate for PISA 2000. In 2003, participation rates both at 
school and pupil level did not meet OECD requirements and England was excluded from international 
comparisons. 
2 Chowdry et al (2010). 
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Figure 2: Average performance of schools by decile of disadvantage 
 
Note: Average performance is measured by the percentage of pupils achieving five or more GCSEs at A*-C. 
Schools divided into 10 equal deciles, depending on their disadvantage in each period, as measured by the 
percentage of pupils eligible to receive free school meals (where decile 1=most advantaged; decile10=most 
disadvantaged). 
Source: derived from the Annual School Census and the School Performance Tables 
 
 
Has it been worth the money? 
 
Yes, the rise in expenditure has been cost-effective. There is clearly much more that could 
be done.  
 
It is easy to point to problems in the comparability of tests over time and therefore difficult to 
measure progress. But there is no such problem in measuring the costs. Since 2000, school 
expenditure has increased by about 40% in real terms for both primary and secondary 
schools. In 1997/98, expenditure on education and training as a percentage of GDP was 4.9% 
(the same level as 1987/88) whereas in 2006, it was 5.9% of GDP. This brings the UK to just 
above the OECD average.  
 
The increase in expenditure has partly been used to bring pupil-teacher ratios down. It fell 
from 18.6 in 1997 (for all primary/secondary/nursery schools) to 16.9 in 2008. The UK still 
has high primary class sizes compared with other OECD countries (see Table 1).  
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Table 1: International comparisons of education spending and class size 
 Expenditure on all levels of 
education as a percentage of 
GDP (2006) 
Average class size in 
primary education (2007) 
UK 5.9% 24.6 
United States 7.4% 23.1 
Germany 4.8% 22.1 
France 5.9% 22.6 
Sweden 6.3% - 
Finland 5.8% 19.8 
OECD average 5.7% 21.4 
Source: OECD Education at a Glance, 2009 
 
Within the UK, there is an enormous difference between the resources provided to the state 
sector and what is offered in the private sector. Although average class size is 24.6 overall in 
primary schools, it is only 13.1 in private (primary) schools. 
Not surprisingly, there is a high wage premium in the labour market for people who attended 
private school (even controlling for background characteristics). Machin and Murphy (2010) 
show that three and a half years after graduation, men and women who went to private school 
earn more than those who went to state schools by 8% and 6% respectively. 
Would even more investment in the state sector help to close this gap? To answer this 
question, it is useful to ask whether the additional resources given to state schools in recent 
years have helped to improve educational attainment. 
Holmlund et al (2009) analyse the relationship between pupil expenditure and attainment in 
key stage 2 tests of English, maths and science, after taking account of pupil-level and 
school-level characteristics (including all effects that could be attributed to schools which do 
not vary over time). They find that pupil expenditure has a positive and significant effect on 
all tests. The order of magnitude is fairly modest but is sufficient for likely benefits to 
outweigh costs. Table 2 summarises evaluation studies conducted at CEP. 
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Table 2: CEP evaluation of government policies: evidence of effects on pupils’ 
educational attainment 
Policy Sector Project Positive Little or 
no effect 
Additional 
comments 
Choice and 
competition  
Primary Gibbons, Machin and 
Silva (2006, 2009) 
 
 √ Suggestion that 
small effect might 
be possible in 
schools with 
greater autonomy 
 
Increasing 
overall school 
expenditure 
Primary Holmlund, McNally and 
Viarengo (2009) 
√  Modest effects but 
large enough to be 
cost-effective – 
effects 20-40% 
higher for 
disadvantaged 
pupils 
 
Literacy and 
Numeracy 
Strategies 
 
Primary Machin and McNally 
(2008, 2010) 
√  Moderate effects at 
very low cost 
Academies Secondary Machin and Wilson 
(2009) 
 √ Early days in the 
evaluation of this 
policy 
 
Excellence in 
Cities 
Secondary Machin, McNally and 
Meghir (2007) 
√  Modest effects but 
large enough to be 
cost-effective – 
effects are highest 
for the most able 
pupils in schools 
with highest rate 
of deprivation 
 
 
Pupil premium? 
 
A pupil premium attached to poor pupils would help to address inequalities in the current 
system.  
 
One of the issues that has been flagged up by both the Conservatives and the Liberal 
Democrats is the possibility of a pupil premium whereby money would follow economically 
disadvantaged children to the schools they attend.3 This would address a problem that has 
been recognised about the current system: local authorities are less redistributive in how they 
                                                            
3 The proposals have been evaluated in detail by the Institute for Fiscal Studies in a recent study (Chowdry et al, 
2010). Labour have also said they would introduce a ‘pupil premium’ though it is not clear to what extent their 
proposal differs from existing policy. 
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allocate resources to schools than central government is in how it allocates resources to local 
authorities.4 
This arises because local authorities decide on their own funding formulae for schools. 
Although they have to take account of deprivation, they can decide how to do it and to what 
extent. The result is that schools facing the same level of deprivation receive different 
amounts of funding, depending on where they are located. 
Holmlund et al (2009) show that some of the most advantaged schools in the country have the 
same level of per pupil expenditure as some of the most disadvantaged schools. It is relevant 
to note that schools have much freedom in deciding how to use their funding once it gets 
devolved to them. Therefore, there is no guarantee that individual pupils from disadvantaged 
socio-economic backgrounds benefit from the extra school funding even if the ‘pupil 
premium’ were to be adopted. 
However, Holmlund et al (2009) show that increasing overall per pupil expenditure has a 
larger impact on economically disadvantaged pupils (about 20-40% higher than other pupils). 
And in an evaluation of Excellence in Cities, Machin et al (2007) show that the largest effects 
were for pupils of high ability in the most disadvantaged schools. 
Furthermore, efforts to make the school funding system more equitable might help to 
improve the UK’s record on social mobility since this is correlated with inequality. There has 
been much work at CEP showing the UK’s poor record on social mobility.5 Early indicators 
suggest that this has at least not got worse in the last 10 years, although there are mixed 
results on whether things have improved or stayed the same.6 
But efforts to tackle inequality need to do more than address school-related policies. Many 
studies show that family background is the most important determinant of educational 
attainment. For example, Kramarz et al (2008) show the high relative importance of family 
background and early educational experiences for primary school children in England.  
Furthermore, the recession may have made matters worse. Tominey (2010) shows that 
unexpected changes in family income can strongly influence whether children subsequently 
drop out of education or go on to university (especially if these income effects are long-term 
and they happen when children are young). Therefore, policies directed at families are very 
important in attempts to equalise educational opportunities. 
 
Academies and ‘free schools’  
 
There is no evidence that an expansion of the academies programme or the introduction of 
Swedish-style ‘free schools’ would improve average educational attainment. 
 
Perhaps the most radical school initiative to address disadvantage is the creation of 
academies. These schools were originally designed to replace failing secondary schools 
located in socially disadvantaged urban areas. But their coverage is now spreading 
geographically and also to different sorts of predecessor schools (not just the absolute worst 
schools in the local authority). 
                                                            
4 West (2009). 
5 See Blanden (2009) for a review. 
6 Blanden and Machin (2008); Gregg and Macmillan (2009). 
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Academies are publicly funded institutions that are largely run by sponsors (individuals, 
businesses or other groups) outside the public sector. Unlike most other publicly funded 
schools, academies are completely independent of the local authority. The board of governors 
has full responsibility for the school. This covers matters such as the hiring of teachers, their 
conditions of service, and the content of the curriculum outside core subjects.  
This Labour policy creation has been embraced by the Conservatives who want to expand it 
and waive the requirement for private sector sponsors to contribute towards the capital costs 
(which is 10% of building costs or £2 million). The Swedish reforms of 15 years ago are 
taken as the model for the ‘free schools’ that would be created. 
What is the evidence for the success of these ‘new independent schools’ either in the UK or 
in Sweden? Machin and Wilson (2009) consider some early evidence on academies. They 
compare the growth in GCSE performance for schools that became academies with a 
comparison group of similar schools. While there was an improvement in the GCSE 
performance of schools that became academies, it was no different from the improvement for 
schools in the comparison group. 
But it is still too early for the academies programme to be fully appraised on the basis of 
GCSE results. Another important issue (currently under investigation) is the effect of 
academies on the performance of schools in the same local areas. It seems sensible to take 
account of such analysis (available in the next few months) before expanding the programme.  
There have been a number of studies of the effects of the Swedish reform. The study with the 
most convincing methodology and looking at long-term as well as short-term effects is by 
Bohlmark and Lindahl (2008). They use the differential increase in the new independent 
schools across municipalities to see whether the increase is associated with any change in 
overall performance of the municipality. 
They find evidence of only small positive effects in the short-term, which do not persist. 
They speculate that one reason for this could be the fact that the entry of new private schools 
has not been followed by the closing down of state schools. 
This points to a general weakness in the application of market economics to the public sector. 
There is no natural mechanism for the closing down of poor schools (they do not literally go 
bust). The reality that governments will be obliged simultaneously to support new schools 
and the older ‘bad’ ones and the fact that the latter will not exit at an efficient rate needs to be 
factored into the expected cost-effectiveness of a ‘school creation’ policy. 
Furthermore, importing the Swedish model may not make very much difference to the status 
quo. Fifteen years ago, Sweden started from a position of no school choice: pupils had to 
attend the state school in their neighbourhood. 
In the UK, parents have had the right to apply to any school for many years. The problem is 
with people’s empowerment to exercise choice and not with their legal right to use it. Some 
people have greater empowerment than others, and this works against lower income families 
and those with difficulties in accessing and understanding information. There is good 
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evidence that higher income parents move to locations with better schools and that this is 
reflected in house prices.7  
The question about ‘free schools’ or expansion of the academies programme is whether such 
initiatives are likely to provide disproportionate benefits to parents who currently have least 
choice. In theory, a pupil premium for disadvantaged pupils should give an incentive for new 
schools to recruit such pupils. But as discussed by Chowdry et al (2010), the premium would 
need to be very high to reduce the disincentive for schools to attract such pupils.  
Furthermore, the current school admissions code does not allow schools to use socio-
economic background as a basis for selection. Any weakening of the admissions code in this 
respect could work against pupils from poor backgrounds. Moreover, if ‘free schools’ have 
greater freedom to exclude pupils than other state schools, then the latter will bear the full 
cost of educating children with the greatest social problems.  
The creation of new schools does not, of course, directly deal with problems in the rest of the 
state sector. ‘New school’ advocates argue that the increased competition will generate 
increased competition between schools and therefore lead to improvements in the system as a 
whole. But CEP research finds no evidence of a link between choice and achievement and 
only a small positive (non-causal) association between competition and school performance.8 
International evidence on this issue remains mixed. 
 
 
Telling schools what to do? 
 
In practice, all parties have some policies that give schools autonomy and others that ‘tell 
schools what to do’. The key question is when autonomy is appropriate. 
School autonomy is used in political rhetoric. But the truth is that the political parties 
advocate a mixed combination of policies – some allowing schools greater autonomy on 
particular issues and some effectively telling schools what to do. The academies programme 
is an example of the former, whereas examples of the latter include introducing phonics 
programmes (advocated in policy documents by both Labour and the Conservatives) and 
‘setting’ in secondary schools (advocated by the Conservatives). 
There has been research on the relative merits of allowing schools to be autonomous versus 
imposing more centralised control.9 While school autonomy allows better use of 
decentralised knowledge, it might increase the potential for teachers to pursue agendas that 
are not in pupils’ interests. 
In a cross-country analysis, Wößmann (2003) finds that school autonomy in setting 
educational standards and the size of the school budget is negatively related to pupil 
performance. The opposite is true of school autonomy in personnel management and process 
decisions, for example, hiring teachers and setting salaries. Thus, school autonomy is 
efficient in some areas of decision-making but not in others – and the issue is much broader 
than simply whether or not to allow new types of school. 
                                                            
7 Gibbons and Machin (2003) and Gibbons et al (2009). 
8 Gibbons et al (2008); Gibbons and Silva (2006). 
9 For example, Wößmann (2003). 
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Which category does pedagogy fall into? On the one hand, teachers can use their own 
knowledge of their pupils to decide on what teaching method works best. On the other hand, 
teachers may not be equipped with the knowledge of how different methods work and what 
works best. 
It was the poor teaching of literacy and numeracy in some inner city schools in the early 
1990s that prompted the introduction of the literacy and numeracy hours in primary schools 
in the mid-1990s (originally known as the National Literacy and Numeracy Projects, started 
by the Conservatives; then as the National Literacy and Numeracy Strategies, started by 
Labour). In each case, the literacy or numeracy hour was quite prescriptive in terms of the 
content and structure of the daily hour. 
CEP research suggests that these pedagogies were very successful in raising standards of 
literacy and numeracy.10 It is particularly striking that England overtook Wales at the point at 
which these strategies were applied in comparable tests. In Wales, local authorities were 
allowed to do their own thing and thus there was far more decentralisation than in England.  
This example shows that a centralised approach can be more effective than the alternative 
when there is a sound evidence base and when teachers are not fully informed of the relative 
merits of different pedagogies. 
Would this also apply to ‘setting’? This means that pupils are allocated to different classes for 
particular subjects at school on the basis of ability. Currently schools may use setting (and 
many do), but no one is sure of how much of this goes on because available data sets do not 
record the class in which the pupil is taught. 
But there have been a number of studies using English data to examine the likely importance 
of peer group effects. If the ability of peers matter a lot to a pupil’s attainment, this would 
help make the case for ‘setting’ to be more widely applied in schools. 
Although peer group effects have been found to be important in other countries (for example, 
Goux and Maurin, 2007, for Paris, and Ammermueller and Pischke, 2009, using international 
data), studies using English data have not found peers to matter very much for average 
educational attainment.11  
The one proviso is that Lavy et al (2009) find effects that are highly heterogeneous. In brief, 
very low ability peers (in the bottom 5% of the distribution) can negatively affect pupils. 
Very high ability peers (top 5%) have a positive effect on girls but not on boys. Given such 
heterogeneity in the effects, it could well be that schools (and not central government) are 
better placed to decide on whether and how to use setting.  
 
 
                                                            
10 Machin and McNally (2008; 2010). 
11 For example, Gibbons and Telhaj (2008); Lavy et al (2009); and Kramarz et al (2008). 
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Getting the best teachers? 
 
Teacher quality (but not their qualifications) matters for pupil attainment. Attracting ‘high 
quality’ graduates is a challenge in the public sector because of higher earnings’ 
possibilities elsewhere.  
The Conservatives aim to make teaching an ‘unashamedly elitist profession’. By this they 
mean raising the standard of entry in terms of academic qualifications. Labour are also trying 
to increase the status of teaching by introducing a new licence to practice – aspiring to put 
teaching on the same footing as high-status professions like doctors and lawyers. 
There are a number of challenges to these aspirations. First, there is currently a shortfall of 
teachers in England (although this is relatively small – 0.7% of the total); the Secondary 
Initial Training intake has been below the number of allocated places every year since 
1993/94; and a large number of people leave teaching every year (18,000 in 2007/08 – over 
half due to retirement). Therefore the new schemes proposed by the Conservatives need to 
attract highly qualified people in quite large numbers. 
The much-admired scheme to attract graduates into teaching (‘Teach First’) may be the 
largest recruiter of graduates. But the number of graduates placed (500 in 2009) is small in 
relation to the overall need for teachers. 
An interesting article about the pros and cons of ‘Teach for America’ (TFA) was published in 
the journal Education Next (Mikuta and Wise, 2008).12 Research evidence on whether TFA 
teachers are more or less effective than other teachers is quite mixed. The high qualifications 
of graduates on the TFA programme need to be set against the fact that most do not stay in 
teaching for very long (in a context where teaching experience is an important determinant of 
pupil outcomes).13  
Second, although teachers’ salaries have increased in recent years, secondary school teachers 
earn slightly below the national average for graduates, and primary school teachers earn 
about 13% less. Doctors and lawyers earn far more than either.14 Furthermore, the average 
returns to higher education are extremely high. Wage differentials for graduates have not 
diminished in the 2000s despite the increase in supply.15 
A consequence of the increase in graduate opportunities over recent decades (especially for 
women) is that it is more difficult to attract highly qualified people into teaching. For 
example, Nickell and Quintini (2002) show that teachers are being drawn from further down 
the distribution of educational achievement than they were in the past. In this context, 
attracting more highly qualified people into teaching in sufficient numbers is a difficult 
challenge. 
                                                            
12 http://educationnext.org/teachers-for-america/ 
13 But even the more critical author suggests that a positive impact from TFA may come from ‘the creation of a 
new education and societal leaders with abiding interest and direct experience in the problems of educating our 
nation’s disadvantaged’. 
14 The average annual salary of doctors, lawyers, secondary school teachers and primary school teachers is 
£73,598, £55,723, £33,985, and £30,030 respectively (ASHE, 2009 Table 14.7a). The average graduate salary in 
the Labour Force Survey (2008) is £34,443. 
15 Machin and Van Reenen (2008). 
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Does this matter for educational performance? Research shows that teacher quality matters 
but not necessarily educational qualifications. Unfortunately, data for the UK are not suitable 
for analysing this question. 
The best studies are in the United States where ‘total teacher effects’ are measured by looking 
at differences in the growth rates of pupil achievement across teachers. As explained by 
Hanushek (2008), such studies show that ‘teacher quality’ is very important for pupil 
achievement but ‘teacher quality’ is not associated either with educational credentials or 
salaries. In contrast, a recent study looks at cross-country data and finds evidence of a 
positive relationship between teachers’ salaries (and relative salaries) and pupil 
performance.16  
 
 
Improving behaviour 
 
Research evidence suggests that voluntary programmes to encourage parental involvement 
can improve the behaviour of the entire class. 
A reason why teachers quit is sometimes reported as poor pupil behaviour. Tackling this 
issue might help to retain teachers as well as being important in itself. Policy proposals by 
both Labour and the Conservatives reflect their belief that involving parents is central to this.  
The ‘behaviour contracts’ proposed by the Conservatives and the ‘home school agreements’ 
proposed by Labour aim to make clear what is expected of parents (with sanctions for those 
who do not meet expectations).  
Recent research in Paris shows the potential effects of encouraging parents to become more 
actively involved in their children’s education (by voluntary means rather than compulsion). 
Avvisati et al (2010) show that parents’ involvement can be increased through relatively 
simple information programmes, even in deprived areas. These programmes consist of an 
invitation to three meetings for parents of 11 year olds where the topics were about how 
parents should help their children. 
The really important finding of this research is that informing and motivating a relatively 
small set of parents led to an improvement in the overall behaviour and educational 
performance in the class (not just for the children of the parents who volunteered).  
It might also be that attempts to improve pupil wellbeing directly (advocated by Labour in the 
Every Child Matters agenda) have a knock-on effect on their behaviour. One in-school 
approach has been a trial of the Penn Resilience Programme, which involves the development 
of a special curriculum to build resilience and to promote optimistic thinking, adaptive coping 
skills and social problem-solving among children. This is an intensive programme, requiring 
teacher training and 18 hours of workshops. 
It is early days in the evaluation so it is not yet known whether pupil behaviour has been 
affected. But interim findings show significant positive impacts in terms of improving 
indicators of pupils’ mental health.17  
 
                                                            
16 Dolton and Marcenaro-Gutierrez (2010). 
17 Challen et al (2009). 
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Higher education 
 
Research evidence suggests that higher fees can be justified, though it is important to have 
a well-understood support system in place. 
So far, all the discussion has been about schools. But an issue that politicians will want to 
avoid in the election campaign is what to do about university fees and whether to raise the 
cap. The review of university fees will not happen until after the election. The Liberal 
Democrats are the only major political party aiming to scrap tuition fees. The other two have 
not said what they would do about the cap on fees.  
The economic case for having university fees is clear-cut. On average, there is a large wage 
return to having a university degree. For example, detailed research using the cohort studies 
suggests that the average return from going to university compared with leaving school with 
one or more A-levels is of the order of 15% – and higher for women.18 
Given that graduates receive such large private returns, it is difficult to see why people who 
have not gone to university (the vast majority) should subsidise those who have – especially 
in view of the fact that people who go to university in the first place are over-represented 
among the relatively well-off.19  
On the other hand, there does need to be some means of supporting young people to go to 
university because no one is able to get a large loan from a bank on the strength of potential 
future earnings. Furthermore, piling up of debt at an early point of a person’s career might 
put-off those from relatively poor backgrounds from going to university at all. 
The government response to this has been to set up a generous system of loans and grants. It 
is very important that the loan is payable only after university when a person is earning a 
salary of at least £15,000. The repayment is then 9% of earnings over that amount. Given 
these very generous terms, media reports of university graduates saddled with thousands of 
pounds of debt are grossly misleading.  
Given likely cuts in university funding, it will probably be necessary to raise the cap on 
university fees. Currently most universities charge the maximum (£3,225 per year). An 
important question is whether there is justification for large differential fees for different 
universities and courses. 
There are many studies showing that subject studied and the institution attended matter 
greatly for how much graduates earn.20 Recent evidence suggests that institutional quality has 
a premium in the labour market and this is likely to be particularly high for top institutions.21  
Such research suggests that there is indeed justification for allowing fees to vary by 
university institution and course. But in cases where university fees are high, it will be 
important to offer differential subsidies to avoid putting off the highly able but least well off 
pupils from applying to top universities and courses. 
Conclusions 
                                                            
18 Blundell et al (2000); Bratti et al (2005). 
19 Chowdry et al (2008). 
20 For example, as reviewed in Machin and McNally (2007). 
21 Hussain et al (2009). 
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Analysis of recent experience suggests that resources matter for educational attainment and 
results would suffer if the sector had to face cutbacks. Tackling inequality of opportunity in 
education requires programmes that are directed at families as well as schools because family 
background is the most important determinant of educational outcomes.  
Claims that the introduction of more new schools (whether ‘free’ or ‘academy’) would 
improve average educational attainment have been greatly exaggerated. The most relevant 
research evidence does not support this conclusion. A research finding that some independent 
schools improve performance is not the same thing as a research finding that says that more 
independent schools would improve the educational system overall. 
There are important interactions between different parts of the education system. In 
particular, the thorny issue of how to close schools (whether ‘free’ or ‘non-free’) when they 
are seen to fail needs to be addressed. But there is an important debate to be had about areas 
in which school autonomy and parental participation in schooling can be increased. This is a 
different debate from one that focuses exclusively on whether or not there should be more 
‘free’ or ‘academy’ schools.  
Whatever position is taken on the ‘school creation’ or school autonomy debate, attracting 
high-quality teachers to the profession is a top priority. Research suggests that high-quality 
teaching matters hugely but that this is not measured by teacher qualifications. The challenge 
of attracting and retaining more highly able teachers in the context of a competitive labour 
market should not be underestimated. This does not come cheap. 
 
April 2010 
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Health: Higher Spending has Improved Quality, 
But Productivity Must Increase 
 
• UK healthcare spending has increased by nearly 7% a year in real terms in the 
last decade – the largest ever sustained increase in the history of the National 
Health Service. 
 
• Spending on the NHS will slow in the next decade, making it necessary to 
achieve significant improvements in productivity. Neither of the major 
political parties has been explicit about their budget proposals for the NHS or 
provided specific plans to improve the productivity of the health service.  
 
• Since taking office in 1997, the Labour government has implemented a 
combination of market-based reforms to the hospital sector and performance 
management for general practitioners (GPs) and waiting times.  
 
• Clinical performance and patient satisfaction have increased substantially and 
waiting times have dropped significantly since Labour has been in power.  
 
• The NHS still lags behind other European countries on several quality 
indicators and in particular on cancer mortality.  
 
• A key battleground in the General Election will be over the centralisation of 
the health service. The opposition parties want to abolish targets and the 
Conservatives are also proposing to limit political involvement by creating an 
independent NHS board. 
 
• There has been a rush of policy proposals in the run-up to the election. 
Recently, the Labour government has proposed paying for social care for 
anyone in care for more than two years. Likewise, the Conservatives have 
proposed guaranteeing all NHS patients access to any cancer medication that 
has been approved since 2005. Neither party has directly addressed how to 
pay for their proposals. 
 
 
42 
 
Introduction 
 
The National Health Service will be a central issue in the 2010 General Election. Over 
the last decade, the Labour government has nearly doubled NHS spending in real terms 
and has introduced significant reforms across the health service. During the same period, 
the NHS has improved considerably on most measures of quality and patient satisfaction, 
although it still lags behind a number of comparable European countries on cancer 
survival and the quality of stroke and heart attack care.  
Both major parties have pledged to continue to increase NHS funding in real terms going 
forward. However, the rate of real terms increases from 2010/2011 onwards will be 
significantly slower than the increases from the last decade. This slowdown in NHS 
spending increases will place considerable pressure on the health service to become more 
productive. Thus far, neither party has been explicit about their plans either to rein in 
healthcare spending or to make the NHS more efficient.  
A focal point of the debate between the two major parties is likely to be over the degree 
of centralisation of the health service. The Conservatives have pledged to create an 
independent NHS board that will lead the management of the NHS, shift the Department 
of Health’s focus onto public health and abolish the centrally set targets created by 
Labour. The Labour party will campaign on their existing record with the health service, 
advocate continuing reform and introducing into law key patient ‘rights’, such as 
maximum waiting times.  
 
 
NHS spending 1997-2010  
 
Since 1997, NHS spending has increased at a faster rate than at any other period in time 
to £127 billion in 2010/11 (see Figure 1). NHS spending increased by 4% annually over 
the lifetime of the NHS, but since 2000 it has increased by approximately 7% in real 
terms. 
The Labour government increased funding as part of a concerted effort to raise healthcare 
spending in the UK as a proportion of GDP up to the European average. Healthcare 
expenditure is estimated to be 9.3% of GDP in 2010/11, with the NHS accounting for 
approximately 18% of UK public expenditure. 
This rise in spending has resulted in a 2.8% increase in total NHS staff; a 4.8% increase 
in NHS consultants; and a 2.3% increase in nurses since 1996 (see Figure 2). In addition, 
NHS infrastructure has expanded greatly, staff salaries have risen and the number of 
patients treated in the NHS per year is significantly higher today than it was in 1997. It is 
worth noting that the NHS in England currently employs approximately 1.3 million 
people, which means that over 2% of the English population works for the health service.  
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Figure 1: Annual spending on the NHS (£ billion) 
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Figure 2: Staff numbers in the English NHS 
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The need to increase productivity 
 
The NHS will face considerable pressure to become more productive over the next 10 
years. Both major parties have pledged to continue to raise NHS spending in real terms. 
But it is highly unlikely that the rate of growth in the next decade will come close to the 
7% annual increases that the NHS has seen since 2000. To maintain a modest increase in 
spending on the NHS, other departments across Whitehall will need to slow their 
spending or the government will need to increase taxes.  
Demographic changes will require 1.1% annual increases in NHS spending to maintain 
the current levels of quality and outputs, on top of additional spending necessary to adopt 
new technology and cater to the rising demand for healthcare across the population.1 
Between 2009 and 2017, the population of England is projected to grow by 
approximately 6.3% and it will age substantially, placing additional pressure on the NHS. 
Because of this rising pressure on the NHS, both major parties will need to be explicit 
about their plans to make the NHS more efficient.  
 
 
A decade of reform – mobilising the spending 
 
To take advantage of the increase in spending, there have been three central themes to the 
Labour government’s healthcare reforms: 
 
• An increase in centrally set targets, particularly in relation to waiting times. 
 
• A new general practitioner (GP) contract that enables providers to earn 
additional revenue by achieving various clinical and service related quality 
targets. 
 
• An increase in patient choice and a new activity-based reimbursement system 
for providers, which has created significantly more competition between 
hospitals. 
 
From 2000 onwards, the government created a range of centrally set government targets 
and published a number of quality indicators, including hospital waiting times. There was 
significant punishment doled out to poorly performing hospitals, including the sacking of 
senior management as well as public ‘naming and shaming’. 
In contrast, hospitals that met the centrally set targets were eligible for increased fiscal 
and managerial autonomy and could eventually earn ‘foundation trust’ status – essentially 
become a local cooperative that was exempt from many government targets. 
Research comparing waiting times in Scotland (which did not introduce targets) and 
England (which did introduce targets) finds that the targets had a significant impact on 
                                                 
1 Appleby et al (2009). 
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shortening waiting times.2  Unfortunately, the reliance on targets likely led to significant 
‘gaming’ of waiting times figures, and they have also frustrated the medical profession. 
The second theme of the Labour government’s reforms was the new GP contract, created 
in 2004. The contract, known as the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF), allowed 
GPs to earn additional revenue by meeting set criteria related to their clinical 
performance, patient experience and managerial competence.   
A typical QOF clinical measure would be the percentage of patients with coronary heart 
disease who had their cholesterol measured during the year. Under the scheme, GPs 
could earn up to an additional 25% on top of their base salary. As GPs reacted with 
vigour to these financial incentives and met far more of the targets than the government 
initially expected, the plan cost approximately £2 billion more than planned.  
The third theme of the reforms involved increasing patient choice and introducing 
hospital competition. To create competition, every patient in England was allowed to 
select where they could receive secondary care and the government introduced a 
reimbursement scheme that paid hospitals a fixed fee for each patient they treated. 
There was an increase in publicly available data on clinical performance to inform 
patients’ choices, and the government encouraged private sector providers to enter the 
market and compete with traditional NHS hospitals. Beginning in 2006, every patient in 
the NHS was offered a choice of at least four providers and from April 2008 onwards, 
patients could choose to be treated at any facility in England, public or private, as long as 
it met minimum quality standards and was paid for using the NHS tariff.  
Initial evidence suggests that hospital competition has created incentives for providers to 
improve their clinical performance. After the reforms were introduced in January 2006, 
hospital mortality has decreased more quickly in hospitals located in more competitive 
markets.3 
In addition, CEP research suggests that one mechanism through which higher 
competition improves clinical outcomes is by fostering better management practices.4 
Nevertheless, the Labour government has begun to shy away from competition. The 
government has become increasingly critical of private sector providers, arguing that 
traditional NHS hospitals should be the preferred providers for NHS patients.  
 
 
Have the investments and reforms paid dividends? 
 
On virtually every measure of quality, the NHS has improved considerably since 1997. 
The NHS has also become more equitable as regularly published NICE (National 
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence) guidelines have helped to prompt a more 
uniform uptake of new drugs and technology across the country. Nevertheless, on some 
                                                 
2 Propper et al (2008). 
3 Cooper et al (2010). 
4 Bloom et al (2010). 
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measures of clinical performance, particularly in relation to cancer survival, the UK does 
not compare favourably with levels of performance in North America and continental 
Europe. 
The continued rise of international comparisons will put significant pressure on NHS 
policy-makers to improve their performance relative to their European neighbours. 
Similarly, in addition to their significant policy successes, the Labour government has 
had some dramatic failures, such as the £12 billion information technology project that 
was recently scaled back by Chancellor Alistair Darling.  
 
Waiting times and patient satisfaction 
The government has made significant progress on hospital waiting times and the waiting 
times for care in Accident and Emergency departments. The number of patients on 
waiting lists has decreased by approximately 600,000 patients since 1997 and average 
waiting times have fallen substantially. 
In addition, the distribution of waiting times across different socio-economic groups has 
become more equitable. In 1997, the poorer you were, the longer you waited. By 2007, 
there was almost no variation in waiting times across different socio-economic groups 
(see Figure 3).  
Patient satisfaction with the NHS is at its highest point in 20 years. In 2008, 51% of 
people in Britain were ‘very satisfied’ or ‘quite satisfied’ with the NHS, an increase of 9 
percentage points since 2000 and 17 percentage points since 1997.5  
 
NHS productivity 
According to the Office for National Statistics, NHS productivity fell over the period 
1995-2008.6 This reduction was largely driven by the tremendous increases in staff 
numbers during the period that was not matched by increases in outputs. 
But recent research finds that from 2004/5 onwards, NHS productivity increased.7 These 
results have been driven by increases in the number of patients treated in the NHS, 
improvements in the quality of care delivered to patients and a decrease in the use of 
temporary staff.  
Some of the additional spending during this period went towards hiring new, more 
qualified management teams and bringing in outside contractors to improve NHS hospital 
management. As the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee has highlighted, 
historically lacklustre hospital financial management was a source of inefficiency and it 
is likely that the current increases in productivity have been driven by recent 
improvements in management quality (see Bloom et al, 2010).  
                                                 
5 Appleby and Phillips (2009). 
6 ONS (2010). 
7 Street and Ward (2009). 
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Figure 3: Median waiting times in England 1997-2007  
 
 
Notes: I = least deprived quintile of the population; V = most deprived quintile of the population’ 
deprivation is measured using Carstairs Index of Deprivation, measured at the output area. 
Source: Cooper et al (2009). 
 
Death rates from heart attacks  
Between 2003 and 2008, the mortality rate for patients admitted to hospital with a heart 
attack has fallen by approximately 20% (see Figure 4). This reduction in mortality has 
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been driven partly by an increase in the speed that patients with a heart attack are treated 
with best practice interventions (thrombolysis or angioplasty). 
Because the elements that make for high quality heart attack care, such as better 
organisation within the hospital, lead to better care for other clinical conditions, 
improvements in heart attack care are likely to reflect improvements in care that are 
happening across hospitals.8 
 
Figure 4: 30-day in-hospital mortality rate in the English NHS 
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Source: MINAP (2009). 
 
International comparisons 
 
Despite significant improvements in clinical performance across the NHS, health 
outcomes in the UK, particularly for cancer, strokes and heart attacks, still do not 
compare favourably with other European countries or the United States (see Figure 5).  
According to a recent study in Lancet Oncology, the five-year breast cancer survival rate 
in the United States is 83.9%, compared with a UK five-year survival rate of 69.7%. For 
prostate cancer, US five-year survival is 91.9%, compared with a five-year survival rate 
in the UK of 51.1%.9 
                                                 
8 MINAP (2009). 
9 Coleman et al (2008). 
30-day AMI Mortality Rate 
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The reason why the UK falls behind on cancer mortality is likely to be because of 
differences in the speed of access to diagnostic services, the UK’s waiting times to 
treatment and delayed access to some new medications.  
 
Figure 5: Cancer mortality in five OECD countries 
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Source: OECD (2007). 
 
 
Policy differences between the parties 
 
The Conservatives will focus on improving public health and decentralising the NHS. 
They will advocate creating an independent NHS board that manages the health service 
and is accountable to parliament, but is not composed of elected officials. Their hope is 
that an NHS board will insulate politicians from the day-to-day running of the NHS and 
allow policy-makers to make difficult decisions, which are often not politically popular.  
Creating an NHS board, the Conservatives argue, would also allow them to shift the 
focus of the Department of Health from managing the day-to-day running of the health 
service to concentrating on public health. But every opposition party argues for the merit 
of increasing the autonomy of the NHS, but realises soon after taking power that political 
realities often make it impossible to do so.  
In addition, the Conservatives plan to create a larger role for GPs in purchasing care and 
being responsible for improving public health. They have announced plans to expand the 
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GP QOF contract to include significantly more public health measures that GPs would be 
responsible for achieving.  
All three of the main parties have placed strong emphasis on the need to publish data on 
hospital quality and provider performance and continue to provide patients with a choice 
of where they receive care. 
A key difference between the parties is that both the Liberal Democrats and 
Conservatives plan to abolish targets, whereas Labour intends to reduce the number but 
continue them in certain key areas. The Labour government has been working to put into 
law key ‘rights’ that NHS patients should expect. The rights will be added to the NHS 
Constitution, which outlines what healthcare workers, patients and the public can expect 
from the health service.  
As the election has drawn near, the Labour government and the Conservatives have 
begun to introduce significant policy proposals designed to reverberate with the 
electorate. Recently, the Labour government introduced a White Paper outlining a 
proposal to pay for social care for anyone in care for longer than two years.10 Along the 
same lines, the Conservatives have outlined plans to spend £200 million on funding 
cancer medications that are licensed but not approved for use by NICE. 
Neither party has described their policies in detail, nor have they concretely outlined how 
they will pay for their proposals. For a complete list of Labour and Conservative policy 
proposals, see Figure 7.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Labour has dramatically increased NHS funding and introduced significant reforms 
across the NHS during their time in government. They have aimed to mobilise the 7% 
real annual growth in NHS spending by creating a new GP contract that links pay to 
performance and introducing market-based reforms to the hospital sector. 
Thus far, there has been little research that has directly linked Labour’s reforms to 
improvements in outcomes. But research that is beginning to emerge is demonstrating 
that Labour’s various reforms have probably made a positive difference on quality, 
efficiency and equity. 
On virtually every measure of performance, the NHS has improved significantly since 
1997, making the decade a transformative period for the health service. But despite such 
significant improvements, on several key indicators of clinical quality, the NHS still does 
not compare favourably with other European countries.  
The NHS will face substantial financial constraints in the next decade, which make it 
necessary for the health service to become significantly more efficient. Both major 
political parties will campaign to continue to raise NHS spending in real terms. But the 
                                                 
10 Secretary of State for Health (2010). 
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rate of spending increase will pale in comparison to what the health service has seen in 
the last decade, regardless of who wins the General Election. 
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52 
 
Figure 7: Key Labour and Conservative policy proposals11 
 
Labour Policy Proposals  
Policy Description Source 
Creating more foundation trusts The government has pledged to continue to give 
high-performing hospitals increased managerial 
and fiscal autonomy by granting foundation trust 
status. Failing hospitals will have their 
management teams replaced. 
http://www2.labour.org.uk/manifesto-splash 
Include the right to treatment 
within 18 weeks within the NHS 
Constitution 
Proposing to make 18-week time to treatment a 
guaranteed, legal right in the NHS constitution. 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Consultations/Live
consultations/DH_108012 
Include the right to cancer test 
results within one week within 
the NHS Constitution 
Would guarantee patients a right to have 
diagnostic tests for cancer carried out and 
reported back to them within seven days. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/sep/
26/speeches.labourconference 
Include the right to five-year 
physicals for everyone age 40-74 
within the NHS Constitution 
Proposes to require every adult from age 40-75 
to have the ability to access a ‘health check’.  
http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page14171 
Choice of GPs Proposal to abolish GP catchment areas so that 
patients can register with the practice of their 
choice.  
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/MediaCentre/Speec
hes/DH_105366 
Reforming social care The government has proposed creating a national 
care service funded by compulsory 
contributions. Recently, the government pledged 
to begin by making care free for those in care for 
over two years.  
http://careandsupport.direct.gov.uk/consultati
on/ 
 
http://careandsupport.direct.gov.uk/the-
white-paper-and-supporting-documents/ 
 
 
  
                                                 
11 The information in this table is derived from the King’s Fund election webpage (http://www.kingsfund.org.uk/general_election_2010/). 
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Conservatives  
More patient choice and 
information 
The party has proposed to give patients more 
choice and continue to promote publicly 
available information on quality. 
http://www.conservatives.com/~/media/Files/
Green%20Papers/A%20Healthier%20Nation.
ashx?dl=true 
More competition The party will place more emphasis on 
competition between providers and will allow 
NHS patients to have more access to care at non-
profit and private facilities. 
http://www.conservatives.com/Policy/Where
_we_stand/~/media/Files/Draft%20Manifest
o/DraftHealthManifesto.ashx 
Plan to withhold hospital 
payment if patient acquires 
hospital avoidable acquired 
infection 
The party has pledged to withhold payment for 
cases where the patient acquires an avoidable 
infection in the hospital. 
http://www.conservatives.com/Policy/Where
_we_stand/~/media/Files/Draft%20Manifest
o/DraftHealthManifesto.ashx 
NHS Independent Board The party will create an NHS board to allocate 
resources and manage the NHS. 
http://www.conservatives.com/Policy/Where
_we_stand/~/media/Files/Draft%20Manifest
o/DraftHealthManifesto.ashx 
Re-introduce GP-commissioning The party will give GPs the ability to hold 
resources and purchase services for their 
registered patients.  
http://www.conservatives.com/Policy/Where
_we_stand/~/media/Files/Draft%20Manifest
o/DraftHealthManifesto.ashx 
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ELECTION ANALYSIS 
 
 
Bankers’ Bonuses 
 
• Over the decade from 1998, the top 10% of workers in the UK saw their share of total 
annual wages rise from 27% to 30%. The majority of this went to the top 1% and can 
be mainly accounted for by bonuses to financial sector workers. By 2008, the 
increased share that bankers were taking amounted to an extra £12 billion per year in 
wages alone. 
 
• The size of these bonuses and their structure may have been a contributing factor to the 
financial crisis. Bankers paid large cash bonuses on the basis of short-term returns 
often unadjusted for risk have incentives to take on excessive risk. 
 
• All the parties have attacked bankers’ bonuses – the Liberal Democrats have said that 
they would ban all bonuses to board members and force all bonuses above £2,500 to 
be paid in shares. 
 
• It is unclear why shifting away from cash toward equity-based compensation would 
alter any perverse risk incentives since unlike a CEO (chief executive officer), an 
individual banker typically has only a small effect on the share price. 
 
• Another proposal is to ‘claw back’ bonuses if performance is sub-standard in the 
future. Unlike simply deferring bonuses, this in principle could improve incentives. 
 
• The government has increased the marginal tax rate to 50% for those earning over 
£150,000 and introduced a one-off 50% tax on bankers’ bonuses over £25,000 for the 
2009/10 pay period. The Conservatives do not pledge to reverse the first policy and the 
second will theoretically have been completed by the time of the election. 
 
• There is very little evidence whether such tax rises will cause a significant number of 
firms and workers to leave Britain. In any case, highly paid workers are likely to 
change their behaviour to minimise the impact of the tax rises and so reduce the 
expected revenue gains to the Exchequer. 
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Introduction 
 
During the campaign, all major parties have attacked bankers with the Liberal Democrats 
referring to them as ‘Scargills in pinstripes’. The size of bonuses in the financial sector has 
exploded in the last decade and has been highlighted as one of the contributing factors to the 
financial crisis. In the UK, the vast majority of the gains at the top of the income distribution 
have come from ‘bankers’ bonuses’, that is, bonuses paid to workers in financial services. 
The focus on the remuneration of bankers is a consequence of the broader issue surrounding 
the ‘moral hazard’ that arises as a result of bailouts. Major financial institutions (and the 
market) have an expectation that the taxpayer will bail out bondholders (and possibly even 
shareholders) if major losses occur that threaten financial stability. This expectation 
encourages excessive risk-taking since the upside accrues entirely to the employees and 
shareholders of the bank while the downside is limited by the taxpayer. 
This problem of moral hazard suggests that while bankers’ pay will continue to receive 
substantial focus from politicians and regulators, it is only one of the many fronts that must 
be tackled from the perspective of financial stability. This Election Analysis addresses four 
questions: 
 
• Why bonuses may encourage excessive risk-taking by bank employees? 
 
• Are there are changes that could be made to mitigate these effects while still 
providing incentives to workers? 
 
• What role can the tax system play in charging banks for the guarantees and subsidies 
provided by the taxpayer? 
 
• Will financial talent be driven offshore by recent tax changes? 
 
 
The size of bonuses and the gains to bankers 
 
The sheer scale of the income gains that the best paid workers, and particularly financial 
sector workers, experienced over the course of the last decade is almost unprecedented. 
Figure 1 shows the total gains (as a share of the aggregate wage bill) going to the top groups 
within the wage distribution between 1998 and 2008. 
Workers in the top 10% gained an extra three percentage points of the wage bill over this 
period. The majority of these gains went to the top 1% of workers, and finance workers 
accounted for almost three quarters of these gains. In contrast to previous decades, this 
expansion of inequality at the very top of the distribution was not matched by rising 
inequality at lower levels. 
The increased share that bankers were taking amounted to an extra £12 billion per year by 
2008, and almost all the gains accrued as a result of bonuses rather than increases in basic 
pay.1 Even these figures underestimate the gains since we have no reliable data on bonuses 
                                                 
1 See Bell and Van Reenen (2010) for a full accounting and discussion of the role of financial bonuses in the 
wage distribution over the last decade. 
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paid in restricted stock and stock options. Accounting for these would certainly make the 
gains at the top even more extreme. 
 
Figure 1: The change in share of all income going to the top 1%, 2-5% and 6-10% 
 
Notes: Figures are computed from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, ONS. 
Source: Bell and Van Reenen (2010). 
 
 
Why should bonuses have contributed to the financial crisis? 
 
Bonuses are generally thought to improve incentives for workers since, in theory, they aim to 
link pay more closely with performance. In a classic piece-rate scheme such as those used on 
production lines, there is accurate monitoring of individual or group output and bonuses are 
paid for past output. Workers in these environments cannot in any sense produce negative 
output going forward. 
Bonuses for traders in financial markets encourage risk-taking since such risk-taking is 
instrumental in producing high returns. Risk-taking is desirable in the financial sector; 
indeed, it is a key reason to encourage performance-related pay. The downside, however, is 
that traders paid bonuses on the basis of the annual profits of their book have an incentive to 
search for short-term profits and to maximise the risk they can take at the expense of the 
long-term interests of the firm. 
These effects become magnified during a period in which the low policy interest rates of the 
major central banks encourage risk-taking and leverage. This is particularly so for traders 
who make money in aggregate only by luck and have no ability to outperform the market in 
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the long run.2 The worst that can happen to such traders is that they lose their jobs but keep 
the bonuses they had previously received. 
All this suggests that to mitigate the excess risk-taking that bonuses can induce, bonuses in 
the sector need to be based on risk-adjusted performance and either to be based on long-run 
performance or to be subject to ‘clawback’ if future performance declines. 
 
 
Altering the mix of bonus compensation 
 
The mix of cash and equity in bonus compensation has been highlighted as an important area 
for reform and regulation. It should be recognised, however, that many investment banks 
have historically paid bonuses in a combination of cash and restricted equity. 
A fairly typical example might be a trader receiving a £500,000 bonus composed of perhaps 
£250,000 cash and £250,000 in equity. The equity would need to be held over a three-year 
period, with a third allowed to be sold at the end of each subsequent year. The proportion 
paid in cash versus equity tended to fall as the size of the bonus rose. 
The motivation for such a bonus structure was to tie top performing workers into the firm by 
raising the costs to the worker of changing firms. Workers who had such a bonus payment 
and decided to leave the firm before the full three-year ‘vesting’ period would lose any 
remaining unvested equity. 
The renewed focus on equity-based compensation focuses on the potential to align workers’ 
incentives more closely with the long-run interests of the firm rather than their lock-in 
properties. Economists have long argued that incentives for chief executive officers (CEOs) 
are more in line with those of shareholders if a substantial proportion of their remuneration is 
in the form of restricted stock and stock options. 
The basic intuition is simple. The CEO takes actions that affect the value of the firm but 
shareholders do not clearly observe these actions. To ensure that the CEO takes the actions 
that maximise shareholder value, it is necessary for shareholders to link CEO remuneration 
directly to the value of the firm. But crucial to this argument is that the CEO’s actions have at 
least some effect on the share price – if not, shareholders should have no interest in sharing 
the value of the firm with the CEO.  
But this is not obviously true for other employees, whose activities almost certainly result in 
at most only a small change in the bottom line for their employer. So it is unclear why a 
worker would alter their risk-taking behaviour only as a result of receiving more 
remuneration in equity than cash. While workers are subject to the same type of ‘principal-
agent’ problems that afflict top management, simply copying the remuneration strategies 
from one to the other is unlikely to be effective. 
 
                                                 
2 There were a number of reports of trading desks that made substantial profits for many years and received 
large bonuses on such profits only to incur huge losses (sometimes as large as the total cumulated profit of the 
preceding years) in the crisis but obviously not to repay the bonuses they had received. 
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Clawback agreements in bonuses 
 
Clawback agreements allow for bonus payments to be recovered from the employee if future 
performance falls below pre-specified standards. These are likely to be particular useful in the 
financial sector because the existence and size of ‘alpha’ (that is, investment returns due to 
the worker’s true ability) is surely only observable in the long run.3 As Rajan points out, 
‘compensation structures that reward managers annually for profits, but do not claw these 
rewards back when losses materialise, encourage the creation of fake alpha’. 
Such clawback arrangements are envisaged in the remuneration code recently implemented 
by the Financial Services Authority (FSA),4 though the teeth of such regulations are an open 
question. The code proposes that a significant proportion of any bonus should be deferred for 
at least three years and a significant proportion of this deferred bonus should be ‘linked to the 
future performance of the firm’ and ‘the business undertaken by the employee’. 
An example of such a bonus system is that now operated by UBS.5 Senior bankers were 
allocated a bonus pool of 900 million Swiss francs, which would pay out in equal parts in 
2010, 2011 and 2012 provided explicit profit targets were met. Following a loss for the 2009 
fiscal year, UBS clawed back 300 million from the pool. 
For clawback contracts to be practical, they must be based on explicit formulae of readily 
observable and verifiable measures of performance since more arbitrary clawback would be 
liable to challenge in the courts. It remains unclear whether such contracts can be 
successfully written for traders based on individual risk-adjusted performance rather than 
simply the overall performance of the firm. 
 
 
Taxing the gains from guarantees and subsidies 
 
One argument in favour of a tax directed explicitly at bankers is to recover the profits that 
primarily occur as a result of both the explicit guarantees (such as deposit insurance) and 
implicit guarantees (for example, ‘too big to fail’) that the sector enjoys from the taxpayer 
and the implicit subsidy provided by central bank liquidity policy.  
Ideally, we would like to estimate the benefit of these guarantees and subsidies to individual 
institutions and charge them appropriately – presumably at some rate going forward as capital 
is replenished.6 This may be unrealistic, in which case a strong argument can be made to use 
the tax system to recover these gains. 
It is, however, unclear why it makes sense to tax bonuses rather than impose a windfall tax or 
subsidy charge on the sector. This second option is essentially what the Obama 
administration has proposed with the Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee, imposing a levy 
based on the size of the balance sheet of large financial firms. 
 
                                                 
3 Rajan (2008). 
4 Financial Services Authority (2009). 
5 http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601085&sid=aXPA95YPD4.0. 
6 We do not here consider the alternative approach of dealing with the ‘too big to fail’ problem – namely 
regulating to make sure they are not too big in the first place. 
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Increasing taxes on high earners? 
 
In addition to regulating the mix, deferral and clawback of bonuses, there has also been a 
more general focus on the issue of raising marginal tax rates on higher earners – either in 
general or directly focused on bonuses. Such a focus is hardly surprising given both the fiscal 
outlook and the dramatic gains that have accrued in recent years to those at the very top of the 
wage distribution. 
The government has moved on both the general front and on bonuses in particular. The 2009 
Budget introduced a new 50p marginal tax rate on those earning over £150,000 (roughly the 
top 1% of wage earners) and tapering the tax relief on pension contributions for these 
workers to the basic tax rate. In the November 2009 Pre-Budget Report, the government 
imposed a 50% tax rate on employers for any bonus paid to an employee in excess of £25,000 
for the current tax year only. The Conservatives do not propose to reverse the first tax 
increase and the second will already be completed before the election. 
There are two common arguments against raising marginal tax rates on bankers (or indeed 
more generally on high-skilled high-earners). First, it is suggested that the behavioural 
responses of labour supply and effort, changes in the form in which compensation is taken 
and reduced compliance will result in the tax yield being significantly lower than expected. 
Evidence suggests that such responses are larger for highly paid workers facing higher 
marginal tax rates.7 
Second, such workers are alleged to be highly mobile and would rapidly relocate to lower tax 
jurisdictions.8 There has been much anecdotal reporting of London-based hedge funds 
scouring Switzerland for suitable premises. 
There is, however, very little robust empirical evidence on international mobility and income 
tax differentials. One notable recent analysis9 suggests that the location choice of football 
superstars in Europe responded strongly to marginal tax rates – though it is a matter of some 
debate as to how workers in London investment banks and hedge funds truly correspond to 
soccer stars. More generally, policy-makers must decide whether such potential flows out of 
London are a price worth paying. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The financial crisis raised awareness of the sheer size of bankers’ bonuses over the last 
decade. This group of workers have been the biggest gainers in the labour market, and they 
have significantly increased their presence at the top of the income distribution.  
The structure of bonuses has come in for sustained criticism as it allegedly increased risk-
taking in the financial sector to dangerous levels and contributed to the unravelling in 2007/8. 
The evidence suggests that simply changing the cash/equity split of such payments will not 
solve these problems nor will deferral if not associated with clawbacks.  
                                                 
7 Gruber and Saez (2002) suggest that the overall elasticity of taxable income with respect to marginal tax rates 
lies between 0.4 and 0.6, with higher elasticities for the highest earners. 
8 Separately, it is argued that tighter financial regulation will encourage firms to relocate to countries with looser 
regulation. 
9 Kleven et al (2009). 
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The sharp rebound in bonuses during 2009/10 is likely to increase the popularity of higher 
marginal tax rates – or special bonus taxes – in spite of the potential negative effects from 
international mobility of workers and firms. 
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ELECTION ANALYSIS 
 
 
Financial Regulation: Can We Avoid Another Great Recession? 
 
• The Great Recession of 2008-2010 had its roots in the crisis of financial markets, 
which spread to the real economy.  
 
• The structural problem with the financial sector is that there is strong ‘contagion’ 
between institutions within the financial sector and also between the financial sector 
and other parts of the economy. A large bank can pull down the financial sector, 
which can, in turn, pull down large parts of the rest of the economy in a ‘domino 
effect’. 
 
• Because of these contagion effects, governments will inevitably bail out banks; and 
because banks know this, they take excessive risks. This structural ‘moral hazard’ 
problem has not been dealt with by the existing regulatory regime. 
 
• To deal with the problem, we need to (a) make bankruptcy more credible; (b) shrink 
the size of banks so that there are fewer organisations that are ‘too big to fail’; and (c) 
improve existing regulations in a variety of ways. 
 
• Most current proposals do not deal with this fundamental problem. Improving 
corporate governance, reforming bankers’ pay and crude taxes on all banks and/or 
financial transactions are mainly distractions. 
 
• Without reform, the risks of a repeat financial crisis have increased. There is less 
uncertainty that governments will bail out banks, and key sectors like investment 
banking are more concentrated.  
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Introduction 
 
The fall in the UK’s GDP since the start of the recession in 2008 has been greater than any 
other since the Great Depression. The global Great Recession originated in the financial 
services sector, especially after the collapse of Lehman in September 2008. 
Although there were many catalysts – such as the global macroeconomic imbalance between 
high spending America and high saving Asia, and inflated property markets – these problems 
became toxic because of the financial sector. There was an extraordinary mispricing of risk, 
which led, in crisis, to massive state support and the subsequent deterioration of the public 
finances. 
This Election Analysis examines what went wrong with the regulatory system for finance and 
how can it be fixed. 
 
 
The fundamental problem 
 
There are two key economic considerations: 
First, liquidity problems in some financial institutions can spread very quickly through other 
institutions. This is what is called the within-industry ‘contagion’ effect: when the system is 
interconnected, ‘systemic risk’ is high, and the whole system can collapse. What makes this 
is a particular problem is that all businesses rely on finance to function – when the sector 
contracts, it pulls down the real economy with it. Crises in other industries are painful – car 
manufacturing, for example – but not fatal to the health of the economic system. 
Second, there are excessive incentives for risk-taking in financial institutions. This is the 
result of the government offering (explicit or implicit) protection for financial institutions 
against bankruptcy. This in turn protects lenders – and not just depositors, but largely all 
lenders – from bad decisions. This is the ‘moral hazard’ problem. 
 
The moral hazard issue is largely a result of an effort to avoid the contagion effects: avoiding 
panics requires insuring depositors and other players, and this requires regulating the industry 
to avoid excessive risk. In other words, if we are going to provide rescues and bailouts, we 
have to limit risk-taking. Unfortunately, these regulatory safeguards did not work. 
The essence of capitalism is that people accept responsibility for the risks they take – they 
enjoy the upside wins, but also suffer the pain if the bet goes the wrong way. Without this, we 
get the moral hazard problem as the downside protection encourages firms to take excessive 
risk. In other words, ‘heads, I win; tails, society loses’.  
 
 
Narrow banking and the Volcker Rule  
 
A large part of the initial reform push has focused on the ‘Volcker rule’. This is the 
suggestion made by President Obama is that ‘Banks will no longer be allowed to own, invest, 
or sponsor hedge funds, private equity funds, proprietary trading operations or for their own 
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profit, unrelated to serving their customers.’1 This has been enthusiastically embraced by the 
UK opposition parties. 
Although the proposal tackles one aspect of the problem – a bank gets cheap money thanks to 
deposit insurance, and then uses it to gamble on the casino of ‘proprietary trading’ – it has 
two shortcomings. 
The first shortcoming is that ‘prop trading’ is not the only way financial institutions take 
excessive risks; in the recent past, the largest problems have been in their ‘plain vanilla’ loan 
portfolios – banks can take too much risk in simple mortgage-backed real estate loans. In 
fact, several of the key institutions that collapsed – AIG, Lehman, Northern Rock and Bear 
Stearns – would have been left completely unaffected by the Volcker rule. 
A second shortcoming of the proposal is that its implementation would be extremely 
complicated. Separating hedging activities from pure speculation has always been 
extraordinarily difficult. 
 
 
Making bankruptcy credible 
 
The solution must lie in reinstituting some fundamental discipline: if a company has too 
much debt and becomes insolvent, taxpayers have no responsibility. The company suspends 
payments, it closes and its shareholders and creditors lose their money. 
How can this threat be reinstituted and become credible for financial institutions after 
Lehman? To make bankruptcy attain the role of disciplining managerial behaviour, two 
changes need to take place: 
 
(1) Financial institutions must be of a size, complexity and interconnectivity that allows the 
regulator to promise credibly that they will be allowed to fail. In other words, there must 
be no banks ‘too big to fail’. As US Congressman Sanders and Bank of England 
Governor Mervyn King put it: ‘if you are too big to fail, you are too big to exist’. This 
can be done through a tax that grows with the size of assets or a literal limit to the size of 
the balance sheet. 
 
(2) Living wills2 must be credible and real, so that any financial institution can disappear in a 
weekend without creating chaos – unlike in the post-Lehman disaster. 
 
Of course, size is not the only characteristic that defines a systemic institution, but it must be 
one of the relevant criteria. First, size should be size in the country. For example, while 
Deutsche Bank (DB) has a balance sheet in the billions of dollars, similar to the Royal Bank 
of Scotland (RBS), home assets of DB are only 16% of German GDP while for RBS, they are 
71% of UK GDP.3 
Second, the diversity and complexity of activities within a bank and the interrelationships 
between them should also be critical criteria in establishing the systemic risk of an 
                                                 
1 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-financial-reform 
2 A living will is a clear statement over what would happen to the assets of a bank were it to fail. Thus it forces 
transparency on the counterparty risks of different positions held by the bank. These need not necessarily be 
made public, but they must be available in a timely fashion to the regulator. 
3 JP Morgan Europe Equity Research, ‘Global Banks: Too Big to Fail?’, 27 February 2010, p9 
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institution. If investors and counterparties cannot have a view of what the institution is doing, 
any problem in any activity may raise doubts about the viability of the whole institution. But 
complexity also makes it hard for the supervisor to predict the consequences of failure, and 
thus makes it more likely that intervention will be needed. 
Third, the centrality of the institution matters. An institution that is very closely connected to 
others in the system will be more likely to bring others down in case of bankruptcy. 
Finally, there are institutions that by their peculiar sphere of action and the novelty of their 
activities, either by the use of financial innovations or simply expanding their business 
activities, may pose more systemic risk.  
Once identified, systemic institutions require unique regulatory solutions. Ideally, no 
institution should be systemic. Credible bankruptcy requires that no institution is too big, too 
complex or too central; regulators should ensure that this is the case. 
 
 
Taxing bank size 
 
An alternative approach to dealing with size is by taxing it – by imposing a cost on the 
institutions that grow too large so that institutions may be forced to internalise the externality 
they impose on the system due to the lack of bankruptcy threat. This would allow extremely 
efficient banks to grow large as they would be willing to bear the costs of a highly 
progressive tax. 
A particularly appealing form (and related to the Obama tax proposals) would be to tax 
institutions as a function of the amount of short-term financing they are using. This is a 
variant of the Obama tax on bank non-deposit liabilities, which was proposed in the United 
States only provisionally (to recoup TARP) but which could have a wider economic aim: it 
would simultaneously discourage excessive size and wholesale financing, two of the key 
causes of the crisis.  
 
 
New regulations, better regulators 
 
Making bankruptcy more credible is the essential step that would lead to a more efficient and 
less risky and fragile financial system. But better regulation and regulators are also necessary. 
These should involve three main steps: 
 
1. Centralised derivatives markets: A complement to making bankruptcy more credible 
would be greater transparency. A centralised payment system allows managers access to 
information on the risk exposure of individual institutions. 
It is hard to understand why the standard contracts currently traded on over-the-counter 
(OTC) markets are not being traded in centralised markets. Centralised markets would have 
reduced many of the uncertainties that took place after the Lehman collapse and would allow 
investors and supervisors to understand better the evolution of derivative markets. 
 
2. Higher liquidity and solvency requirements: A key axis of the current reform proposals is 
increasing solvency requirements. Concerning capital requirements, the main proposal here is 
increasing solvency requirements through contingent capital – debt that would be 
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transformed into equity automatically when certain triggers are reached, which could be 
market triggers (such as credit default swap prices4 reaching a certain level) or regulatory 
triggers (core or tier 1 capital reaching a certain minimum). 
These proposals have merit, but as the crises tend to be liquidity driven, and they do not 
really generate ‘true’ new capital, they are unlikely to solve a crisis.  
As for liquidity, a key problem was excessive short-term financing of long-term liabilities. 
The tax mentioned above on wholesale or short-term financing would also help to deal with 
this problem. 
 
3. Systemic supervisors: A big push here involves the creation of a new set of worldwide 
systemic supervisors with the function of looking at the ‘forest’ of systemic risk, rather than 
the ‘trees’ of how each individual bank is performing.5 It is essential that supervisors have 
real teeth, including ability to impose penalties on non-complying financial institutions. 
One question is the extent to which the systemic supervisor role must coincide with the 
central banking function and be undertaken by a central bank. Synergies between both 
functions are important as Northern Rock showed.6 
Exercising the ‘lender of last resort’ functions (which only central banks can do) requires 
knowing the state of the banks that may have to be rescued, while the information about the 
state of lending and asset quantities and prices held by the banks is an invaluable tool of 
monetary policy.7 Whether this requires merging the Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
back into the Bank of England (as the Conservatives propose) or improving co-operation is 
less clear. 
 
 
Some non-solutions to the regulation problem: corporate governance and bankers’ 
bonuses 
 
Many of the proposed ‘solutions’ to the problem of financial regulation by the main parties 
are wide of the mark and risk distracting us from the major reform tasks. 
Often, policy-makers talk of improved corporate governance to stop senior managers and 
CEOs from ‘ripping off’ shareholders. But for firms relying on the protection of taxpayers, 
the conflict of interest is not fundamentally between bank managers and shareholders because 
the manager wants to earn too much or wants to build an empire or to own a private jet. 
Instead, the conflict is between, on one side, managers and shareholders and, on the other 
side, taxpayers. Both managers and shareholders (and even holders of corporate debt) take 
advantage of the protection of the state to take excessive risks, since it is the taxpayer who 
ends up paying. Therefore proposals to improve transparency and corporate governance are 
completely useless for solving these problems. 
                                                 
4 A method based on credit default swap prices has been proposed by Hart and Zingales (2009). 
5 See Goodhart (2009) 
6 See Shin (2009) 
7 For a clear statement, see the very well argued testimony of Anil Kashyap (2010) to the US Congress; see also 
The Squam Lake Report (2010) and Garicano and Lastra (2010). 
 70
Exactly the same argument goes for proposals to align pay more effectively with shareholder 
interests. The structure of annual bonuses for traders and managers in the financial sector 
does encourage an emphasis on short-term excessive risk-taking. But this is likely to be a 
consequence of structural moral hazard not the cause. It is dealing with the symptom and not 
the disease (see Bell and Van Reenen, 2010). 
Third, generalised taxes on banks (as proposed by the Conservatives) or global financial 
transactions (proposed by Labour) are not well-targeted at the problem of systemic risk. 
Focusing on a more targeted tax regime to reduce the ‘too big to fail’ problem would be a 
better way to go. 
Finally, further competition authority investigations into banking as proposed by the 
opposition parties will tell us what we already know. These have become very concentrated 
industries that threaten welfare – not for the usual reasons (high prices and low innovation) 
but rather for the risks of a further financial meltdown. The cause comes from the problem of 
structural moral hazard and the solutions cannot be delegated to the competition authorities. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The financial meltdown led to the worst post-war recession experienced by the UK and other 
advanced economies. The fundamental regulatory problem in the financial system is that the 
government will bail out the banks because of the risk of contagion from organisations that 
are ‘too big to fail’ to the rest of the economy. This structural moral hazard problem causes 
large financial firms to take excessive risks. 
To deal with this we have to operate on the fundamental problem, which means increasing 
the real threat of bankruptcy and shrinking down the organisations that pose such systemic 
risks. We should not get distracted by reforms such as changes in corporate governance, 
bankers’ pay, bank levies, Tobin taxes or competition inquiries. 
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Jobs and Youth Unemployment: 
It’s bad, but not as bad as you might think 
 
• The Great Recession of 2008-2010 has inflicted a larger cumulative loss of UK output 
than any of the other post-war recessions. Nevertheless, unemployment is much lower 
than we would have expected given past experience. 
 
• Young people have fared badly during the recession, with larger increases in their 
unemployment rates than adults. But young people always do worse in downturns, 
and there is no evidence that they are doing relatively worse this time round than in 
previous recessions.  
 
• Youth unemployment has fallen since the last recession, but then rose after 2004 prior 
to the onset of the current recession. The weakening of the adult labour market can 
only account for part of this rise. Increased immigration, the minimum wage, skill 
demand changes and schooling are other possible explanations – but there is little 
compelling evidence for any of these factors.  
 
• Labour’s welfare reforms – such as the New Deal for Young People introduced in 
1998 – have had a positive impact on jobs. But after 2004, the Employment Service 
put less emphasis on the young unemployed compared with other groups (such as 
lone parents and people on incapacity benefits), and this may be a factor in the post-
2004 rise in youth unemployment. 
 
• The trends for 18-24 year olds ‘not in employment, education or training’ (NEETs) 
follow the same pattern as youth unemployment. NEET rates for 16-17 year olds are 
very high (and rising) only if we include all part-time students. When these are 
removed, teenage NEET rates are more like 10%.  
 
• There is substantial consensus between the main parties on jobs and youth. An 
unanswered question for all parties is: if they think the current system is not working, 
then how will ‘more of the same’ radically improve things?  
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Introduction 
 
Unemployment is a perennial policy concern, and youth unemployment is a particular worry 
because of the ‘scarring effects’ of joblessness, which can persist for a long time in an 
individual’s life.1 
When Labour came to power in 1997, one of the party’s five pre-election pledges was to ‘get 
250,000 under 25 year olds off benefit and into work’. Following on from the previous 
government’s efforts, policies such as the New Deal for Young People emphasised the 
importance of job search. But the new policies went beyond Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) by 
guaranteeing some activity (either subsidised employment, a government job or 
education/training) for all young people who were on JSA for more than six months. 
Despite this policy activism, youth joblessness remains a problem – on some measures, youth 
unemployment is higher today than in 1997.2 Furthermore, youth joblessness has risen 
dramatically since the recession began in 2008. We argue that this is to be expected as 
‘marginal’ groups almost always fare worse during recessions. 
The more surprising fact is that the youth labour market worsened between 2004 and 2007 – 
before the start of the current downturn. This is harder to explain – it is partly linked to the 
sluggishness of the whole labour market, but it may also be linked to changes in the priorities 
of the Employment Service.  
The trends for 18-24 year olds ‘not in employment, education or training (NEETs) follow the 
same pattern as youth unemployment. The NEET rates for 16-17 year olds are extremely high 
– one in five and rising – but only if we include all part-time students. When these are 
removed, teenage NEET rates are more like 10%.  
 
 
The Great Recession of the late 2000s 
 
GDP and aggregate unemployment in the last three recessions 
Figure 1 plots GDP growth and the unemployment rate since 1975 – we use the ILO 
(International Labour Organisation) definition of unemployment from the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) unless otherwise stated. The shaded areas denote the timing of the last three 
recessions: the latest one, the last one (1990s) and the earliest (1980s).  
Unemployment rose sharply in all recessions, peaking at over 11% in 1983 and 10% in 1992. 
After the 1990s recession, unemployment fell steadily, levelling off at historically low rates 
of around 5% in the mid-1990s. When the latest recession hit in 2008 and 2009, 
unemployment climbed to 8% by the first quarter of 2010. 
Figure 2 plots the cumulative loss of GDP since the start of each of the last three recessions. 
The 1980s recession was worse than the 1990s recession. But despite getting off to a slightly 
slower start, the latest downturn has seen a larger cumulative fall of output than even the 
1980s recession – a 6% or more fall in GDP. 
                                                 
1 von Wachter et al (2009) and Gregg and Tominey (2005). 
2 http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/nov/11/cameron-brown-pmqs-youth-unemployment. 
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Figure 1: UK unemployment and annual GDP growth rate, 1975-2009 
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Source: Annual LFS 1975-91 and calendar quarters 1992q2 to 2009q3. ONS GDP from 1975q1 to 2009q4 
(http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/). Annual GDP growth. Unemployment rate (ILO) is measured yearly in 
March/April/May and linearly interpolated. 
 
Unemployment by age group 
Figure 3 plots the unemployment rates for the population of working age (16-64) and for 
three subgroups – prime age (25-49), young (18-24) and teenagers (16-17). The prime age 
group follows the general pattern of the aggregate labour market, but it is clear that the young 
are much more sensitive to the state of the business cycle. The unemployment rate is higher 
for the younger groups, and the magnitude of this disadvantage widens during a recession. 
This outcome is unsurprising as employers will be reluctant to lose more experienced 
workers who have firm-specific skills (and also greater redundancy costs), so the burden of 
adjustment typically falls on low wage workers, such as young people. (Minorities and the 
less educated also tend to fare worse during downturns.) 
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Figure 2: Cumulative growth of GDP in the last three recessions 
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Source: ONS GDP from 1975q1 to 2009q4. We normalise to 1 the quarter before the start of each recession 
(dates as first GDP decrease) 1979q4, 1990q2 and 2008q1.  
 
Figure 3: Unemployment rates by age group, 1975-2009 
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Source: Annual LFS 1975-91 and calendar quarters 1992q2 to 2009q3. Unemployment rate (ILO) is measured 
yearly in March/April/May and linearly interpolated.
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The teenagers do not appear to have experienced the same falls in unemployment after the 
1990s recession as older groups. But this trend conceals important selection effects, as 
increasing numbers of non-employed teenagers are staying in education. We discuss them in 
more detail below. 
Figure 4 plots the employment rate for each of the three recessions. The employment rate was 
at historically high rates in 2007 prior to the latest recession, yet despite the much larger fall 
in output shown in Figure 2, the employment rate has fallen by less than in the previous two 
recessions. This is the sense in which the labour market appears to be performing better than 
in the past. 
 
Figure 4: Employment rates in the last three recessions 
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Source: LFS employment rate from 1971q1 to 2009q3. UK, all individuals aged 16 and over, seasonally 
adjusted (MGSR) (http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/). Reference quarters 1979q4, 1990q2 and 2008q1 (first 
quarter before GDP decrease). 
 
There are a number of possible explanations for this, including: 
 
• A genuine improvement in the way job ‘matches’ are made through a more effective 
Employment Service. This is the ‘optimistic’ story that the cumulative reforms made 
since 1997 – such as the New Deal and Job Centre Plus – have helped to improve 
matching in the labour market. For example, the ability (and incentive) to switch from 
JSA to incapacity benefit has been much reduced, which is a positive move as exit 
rates from disability benefits are much lower than from JSA (in part due to less 
emphasis on helping people look for jobs). 
 
• Greater wage moderation (‘wage flexibility’), which reduces the need for employers 
to shed jobs. 
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• The industrial composition of the shock has been in sectors that have high capital-
labour ratios (for example, finance and manufacturing), so the GDP fall has been 
disproportionately greater than the jobs fall. 
 
• Higher unemployment is still to come (for example, when public sector employment 
starts to fall with planned spending cuts). 
 
But has the recent recession hit young people much worse than in the past? Figure 3 shows 
that the unemployment rate for the young has increased by more than the unemployment rate 
for older groups since the onset of the current recession.  
Furthermore, hourly wages appear to be falling for the younger groups more than the older 
groups; and even for those who are employed, average hours worked fell by more for the 
younger groups than the older groups. This all seems to indicate that young people have been 
bearing the brunt of the adjustment. 
 
Figure 5: Proportionate growth in claimant count by age in the last three recessions 
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Source: ONS claimant count current data up to 2009q4 (1985-2009), historical data (1983-85) and registrants 
(1979-82) by age band (February 2010). Reference quarters 1979q4, 1990q2 and 2008q1 (first quarter before 
GDP decrease). Historical data are for a given calendar month, a monthly time series has been created by linear 
interpolation, leading to the quarterly data, which were seasonally adjusted.  
 
But it could be said that this has been the general pattern in all recessions (‘twas always 
thus’). The unemployment rate for young people is about the same as its 1990s highpoint and 
better than the 1980s peak, despite the fall in GDP being deeper. (The higher absolute 
number of young unemployed is due to the larger labour force and so is not really a relevant 
comparison.) 
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Figure 5 examines this more formally, breaking down the claimant count by age group in 
each recession.3 The growth of youth unemployment (relative to the old) in this recession 
looks no worse than previous recessions – if anything slightly better. 
We conclude that the available information does not suggest that there is a special problem of 
youth unemployment in this recession compared with past experience. The fact that young 
people suffer more during downturns is quite consistent with what has happened in previous 
recessions in the UK and elsewhere. A bigger problem is what was happening before the 
recession. We now turn to this issue. 
 
 
Why did youth unemployment rise before the Great Recession? 
 
Prime age unemployment in the UK has been falling dramatically since the early 1990s – 
from nearly 9% in 1993 to 3% in 2005, after which it broadly stabilised and then rose again 
in 2008. But for the 18-24 age group, unemployment started rising in 2004, several years in 
advance of the recession. Thus there seems to be a component of the adult-youth 
unemployment differential that does not seem to be purely explained by the stronger impact 
of cyclical downturns on young people.  
Despite several forces that may be in theory related to the poor performance of the youth 
labour market in recent years, the bulk of the rise in youth unemployment between 2004 and 
2008 remains largely unexplained. We examine several factors: immigration, unemployment 
benefit reform, the minimum wage and skill demand. 
 
Rising immigration 
As the rise in youth unemployment dates back to 2004, the year of European Union 
enlargement to take in eight countries of Central and Eastern Europe (plus Cyprus and 
Malta), it would be natural to think that the increase in youth unemployment is related to 
stronger competition from immigrant labour.  
The UK has experienced a record increase in immigration in the past few years. The 
proportion of foreign-born population was below 6% in the early 1990s, but is currently 
about 10%. In London, this proportion rose from 28% to the current level of around 40%. If 
immigration has an effect on the labour market prospects of natives, it may hurt youths more 
strongly than adults. Immigrants who are less skilled than natives will be closer substitutes 
for inexperienced youths.  
Although youth unemployment is positively correlated with the share of immigrants in the 
regional labour market, this result is driven solely by the contrast between London and the 
rest of the UK (as London experienced particularly high rates of immigration and a relatively 
higher increase in unemployment). This raises the suspicion that other factors may explain 
this correlation. Overall, there is no compelling evidence of a causal impact of higher 
migration on youth unemployment (Card, 2009). 
                                                 
3 The LFS was only annual prior to 1992, so we cannot do ILO quarterly unemployment rates for earlier 
recessions. 
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Unemployment benefits 
The poor showing of the youth labour market is particularly worrying given the considerable 
policy reform to the Employment Service (especially for young people) in the last two 
decades.  
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) was introduced in 1996 as the main form of unemployment 
benefit and greatly increased the job search requirements for receiving benefits. It did appear 
to reduce the claimant count, but few of those leaving seemed to find sustainable jobs. JSA 
did not seem to improve the overall employment rate significantly (Manning, 2009) and may 
even have reduced it for the young (Petrongolo, 2009). 
While the claimant count and LFS unemployment have been very close until October 1996 
for the population over 18 years old, LFS unemployment remained well above the claimant 
count in the post-JSA period.4 Thus there is evidence of increasing numbers of workers who 
left the unemployment register but did not find jobs. About half of the 18-24 LFS 
unemployed do not claim JSA (compared with a third for 25-49 year olds). When dropping 
out of the welfare system, individuals may become more detached from the labour market 
and spend less effort on job search than while on unemployment benefits.  
The New Deal for Young People was introduced in 1998 with the aim of improving the 
incentives and prospects for young workers to find jobs. All 18-24 year olds on JSA for six 
months now receive help with job search from a dedicated personal adviser. So there is some 
‘carrot’ of job search assistance as well as a tougher ‘stick’ of stricter monitoring. 
Rigorous evaluations show that job finding rates increased by about 20% as a result of the 
policy (Blundell et al, 2004, di Giorgi, 2005). These evaluations exploit the fact that there 
was a large difference in treatment between 24 years olds who were in the programme (the 
‘experimental group’) and 25 year olds who were not (the ‘control group’). Blundell et al 
(2004) also use the fact that the New Deal was piloted early in some areas and showed very 
similar programme effects.  
Around 2004, the Employment Service was incentivised to focus less on young people on 
JSA and relatively more on other groups such as lone parents and those on incapacity benefits 
(through a system of ‘job points’). This was because the problem of long-term youth 
unemployment was thought to have been broadly solved. Although there is no rigorous 
evaluation of this change, the timing does make one suspect that this may have been a cause. 
A further problem is that the increasing numbers of LFS unemployed who are not claiming 
JSA separate them from any direct effect of the New Deal and the Employment Service in 
general.  
 
The minimum wage 
The National Minimum Wage was introduced in the UK in April 1999, but 16-17 year olds 
were exempt. In October 2004, the minimum wage was extended to cover workers aged 16-
17 who are not apprentices, and this coincides with a strong increase in their unemployment 
rate. 
                                                 
4 One possible reading of these series is that the JSA removed from the register those who were not really 
looking for work or claiming fraudulently. Another interpretation is that the non-claimant unemployed simply 
have a level of search effort above the ILO/LFS threshold, but below the JSA threshold.  
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Research in the UK has generally found few jobs effects of the wage floor.5 For example, 
Dickens and Draca (2005) find that the 2003 increase in the minimum wage had insignificant 
employment effects for all demographic groups including youths. Furthermore, if minimum 
wages were to blame, we would expect a positive jobs impact on teenage apprentices, who 
were exempt from the 2004 legislation. In fact, the job rates for 16-17 year olds fell from 
15% in the first quarter of 2003 to 13% in the first quarter of 2007,6 casting doubt on the 
minimum wage explanation. 
 
Falling demand for low skilled workers 
There has been a large increase in wage inequality over the last three decades in the UK. The 
wage premium for being educated has risen despite a huge increase in the supply of college-
educated workers, which implies that there has been an increase in the demand for skills. This 
is probably due to new ‘skill-biased’ technologies, but trade with less developed countries 
like China and India and falls in union power may also play some role. There are similar rises 
in the demand for skills in the United States and other countries (see, for example, Machin 
and Van Reenen, 2008). 
A rise in demand for human capital may disproportionately hurt the young because they have 
less experience. This secular explanation is not so persuasive as youth unemployment was 
falling from 1992 to 2004 (and for parts of the 1980s) in the face of this rising demand for 
skill, so skill biases in labour demand are unlikely to be the explanation. 
One possibility is that the quality of education for the type of young people likely to be 
unemployed may have declined. Although standards as a whole appear to be rising, it is 
possible that targets have led schools to neglect some of the ‘hard to reach’ young people 
who may end up as non-employed. 
 
 
Idle youth? What about the young NEETS?  
 
Unemployment rates may give a misleading impression of the labour market because of the 
large increase in the fraction of young people staying in full-time education. An alternative 
indicator is the proportion of the age group who are NEETs – ‘not in employment, education 
and training’. Reducing the number of young NEETS has been a priority of the Department 
for Children, Schools and Families. 
                                                 
5 Machin et al (2003) detect a mild reduction in employment in the care homes sector after the introduction of 
the minimum wage. As the care homes sector is particularly vulnerable to the introduction of the minimum 
wage given the low starting level of wages, their estimates may be interpreted as an upper bound for the 
aggregate employment effects of the minimum wage. Stewart (2004a, 2004b) finds neither the introduction of 
the minimum wage nor the 2000 and 2001 upratings had significant employment effects for adults (aged 22+) or 
youths (18-21). 
6 The data source is the LFS individual record files. 
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Figure 6: NEET rates 1992-2009 (aged 16-17) 
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Source: LFS calendar quarters 1992q2 to 2009q3. NEET1 defines as NEET (‘not in employment, education or 
training’) all those who are not working, are not enrolled in either education or training, and declare that they are 
not working or studying towards a qualification. This latter information is only available since 2000. NEET2 
defines as NEET those who are not working or enrolled in either education or training. NEET3 defines as NEET 
those whose main economic activity is not education, training or work. 
 
Although the levels of NEET differ for 18-24 year olds, they all show the same trends as the 
youth unemployment rates discussed above – a steady fall from the 1990s recession and then 
a rise starting in 2004 and accelerating in 2008. 
Even prior to the most recent recession, several media reports expressed worries that large 
proportions of 16-17 year olds were ‘doing nothing’ (that is, they were NEETS). But 
measuring the number of NEETS precisely is not straightforward because of the ambiguity of 
whether someone is ‘really’ in education or training (for example, they might say they are at 
school but never turn up).  
The ‘narrow’ definition (defined like the official rate) excludes those who are in any type of 
education or training from NEET. According to this definition, at the end of 2009, about 9% 
of all 16 and 17 years olds were NEET (see Figure 6, series ‘NEET1’). But if we include in 
the NEET count all those who say they are in education or training but would accept a job 
offer, this number leaps to 19% (series ‘NEET3’). 
The difference is mainly in the fact that there are a lot of students looking for part-time jobs – 
and thus it is incorrect to classify them all as NEET or ‘doing nothing’. But at the same time, 
it may be plausible that some of those who declare themselves to be receiving some kind of 
education and looking for jobs have essentially dropped out of the education system – thus 
the ‘narrow’ 9% figure underestimates the NEET rate. 
 83
Figure 6 shows the evolution in alternative NEET measures over time. The ‘narrow’ 
definition (‘NEET1’) is only available since 2000, as it is based on a question about whether 
an individual is ‘working or studying towards a qualification’. To obtain a longer time series, 
we can use information available since 1992 on school attendance and enrolment in training 
programmes (‘NEET2’). For the time span when both measures are available, NEET2 is not 
more than a percentage point above NEET1 and the trends move in an identical way. 
The true trends of teenage NEETs are hard to gauge, partly because there is a lot of seasonal 
variation. On the broad definition, the numbers have stayed high since the 1990s recession. 
The narrow series is only available for a shorter period of time, but here there does seem to 
be some improvement in the post-2005 period with little effect in the recession. 
This suggests that many more teenagers are choosing to stay at school rather than face a 
hostile labour market. The planned extension of compulsory schooling will cement these 
trends. 
 
 
Party policies: spot the difference 
 
There is substantial consensus between the main parties on jobs and youth. All agree on the 
need to guarantee some activity to young people and to integrate the treatment of those on 
unemployment benefit with those on other forms of welfare such as incapacity benefit. 
Labour has pledged a ‘job guarantee’ to all unemployed under 25 year olds7 after six months 
claiming JSA, which seems strikingly similar to the New Deal. 
The Conservatives promise to ‘scrap Labour’s failing employment schemes and create a 
single Work Programme’, which seems almost identical to the current set-up.8 The Liberal 
Democrats are more vague, but it seems likely that they would have a similar guarantee for 
young people after three months.9 The nuances are that the Conservatives seem keener on 
paying third-party providers rather than the Employment Service to place job seekers and 
perhaps being less generous with wage rates for government jobs. 
An unanswered question for all parties is: if they think the current system is not working, 
then how will ‘more of the same’ radically improve things?  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The UK labour market has held up surprisingly well so far given the depth of the current 
recession. Young people, however, have fared much worse than other groups with larger 
increases in their unemployment and bigger falls in hours and wages. 
We argue that, unfortunately, this is to be expected as young people always suffer worst 
during downturns, and it does not seem that (relatively) they are doing particularly badly in 
the latest recession compared with the 1980s and 1990s recessions. 
                                                 
7 http://www2.labour.org.uk/uploads/TheLabourPartyManifesto-2010.pdf, p.2:2. 
8 http://media.conservatives.s3.amazonaws.com/manifesto/cpmanifesto2010_hires.pdf, p.15. 
9 http://www.libdems.org.uk/siteFiles/resources/PDF/Election%20Policy/05%20-%20Jobs%20that%20last.pdf. 
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More worrying, however, is that the fact that youth unemployment and NEET rates were bad 
going into the recession having been rising since 2004. The existing evidence does not allow 
us to give a firm answer as to why, after over a decade of steady improvement, youth 
unemployment started rising in the mid-2000s. 
We think that part of it was due to some softening of the overall labour market, and part of it 
was due to changes in the Employment Service, which targeted other ‘at risk’ groups with 
greater vigour. The other suspects – immigrants, the minimum wage and skill demand – do 
not seem to blame. 
Finally, the refrain of ‘idle youth’ is overstated as the young NEET numbers typically include 
a large number of students who are seeking part-time jobs. 
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ELECTION ANALYSIS 
 
 
Macroeconomics and Public Finance: The worst is yet to come 
 
• The Great Recession of 2008-9 caused a big drop in UK national output, perhaps a 
permanent 5% drop in GDP. The average household’s wealth fell from £375,000 to 
£330,000 between 2007 and 2008 alone. But unemployment, currently 8%, has been 
low compared with previous recessions. 
 
• From 1997 to the eve of the recession, Labour boosted public spending by 1.2% of 
GDP and raised taxes by 2.3% of GDP, reducing the structural deficit. But since 2007, 
the recession blasted a hole in the public finances and, without action, the deficit 
would remain unsustainably high at around 7-9% of GDP.  
 
• Public sector net debt is currently £890 billion. Under Labour’s plans to cut spending 
and raise taxes, this will peak at 76% of GDP in 2014, then decline to around 70% by 
2018, up from a recent average of around 40%.  
 
• The UK’s long-term structural fiscal challenges notwithstanding, market prices do not 
indicate neither an imminent Greek-type fiscal crisis in the short run nor extreme 
inflation. But market appetite for gilts may decline if current debt trends continue and 
when short-term interest rates begin to rise.  
 
• All the political parties are signed up to major cuts in spending and increases in taxes 
to reduce the deficit, but none have put forward a comprehensive plan to meet the 
challenge. The manifestos are broadly similar with the Conservatives planning to put 
a slightly greater emphasis on spending cuts (one fifth of the fiscal squeeze will be in 
higher taxes rather than one third under Labour). 
 
• How soon can we start credibly reducing the deficit without risking the recovery? The 
Conservatives propose to cut government spending by £6 billion more than Labour’s 
plans this year. Regardless of whether these are really ‘efficiency savings’, this still 
withdraws demand from the economy. This means spending cuts in real terms of 
5.1% in all departments except health and overseas aid. 
 
• The Conservatives would have a lower increase in National Insurance after 2011 
(costing £6 billion) and the Liberal Democrats would increase personal allowances 
(costing £16.8 billion). These policies would further raise the deficit unless there are 
offsetting cuts in spending or increases in taxation. 
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Introduction 
 
The economy seemed to have had a near death experience during the Great Recession of 
2008-2010. This Election Analysis describes where we are now in terms of macroeconomic 
performance and the impact on the public finances. We then look at the policy options, 
focusing on debt reduction and economic recovery, and compare the parties’ positions.  
All main parties are promising huge cuts in spending and tax increases, but they are not really 
specifying where these will come from. The debates have focused on the narrower question 
of the speed with which deficit reductions will kick in, which are relatively minor. This raises 
the danger that the public will resist the unpleasant medicine that is coming in the next few 
years.  
This analysis starts with where we are now, then addresses the future of public debt before 
analysing the policy positions of the major parties. 
 
 
Where are we now? 
 
A permanent fall in GDP? 
From the early 1990s to 2007, the UK economy had a very smooth and buoyant ride: GDP 
grew steadily at around 3% a year, house prices grew at an average of 10% and 
unemployment fell from 10% to 5%. Although share prices fell sharply between 2000 and 
2002, the effects on the rest of the economy were mild. 
In the middle of 2007, these trends suddenly reversed. Compared with the summer of 2007, 
GDP has fallen by 4%, unemployment has risen to 8%, house prices have fallen by 15% and 
share prices have fallen by 20%. 
Typically, recovery from a recession is sufficiently strong so that GDP and other variables 
entirely make up the lost ground and return to their earlier trajectories. There are some 
concerns that this may not occur in the aftermath of the 2008-10 recession. The 2010 Budget 
predicts a 5% permanent drop in output. 
Charts showing historical and projected GDP are shaped like lightning bolts: a downward zag 
during 2008 and 2009, returning to an upward zig that never meets the old path (see Figure 
1). Concerns about output loss are based on historical evidence that financial crises can cause 
permanent effects on GDP. But the magnitude is highly uncertain; for example, the OECD 
estimates a loss of 2-4% and the IMF a loss of 10%. 
 
Unemployment up, but by less than expected 
Figure 2 shows unemployment rates and GDP growth since 1974 (recessions in grey). 
Although the latest figures show we appear to be out of recession, the cumulative fall in 
output during the most recent recession has been greater than in the 1980s and 1990s. But 
unemployment has risen by less and still stands well below the peaks of the 1980s and 1990s. 
Part of this may be due to an improvement in the functioning of the labour market with a 
more effective Employment Service and programmes like the New Deal.1  
 
                                                 
1 See CEP Election Analysis on jobs and youth unemployment 
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/news/year.asp?yyyy=2010#2015). 
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Figure 1: GDP, historical and projections by the Bank of England 
 
Source: Bank of England Inflation Report, February 2010. 
 
 
Figure 2: UK unemployment and annual GDP growth rate, 1974-2010 
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GDP preliminary estimate for the first quarter 2010. 
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Assets down, savings up  
The recession hit the UK harder than some other countries because asset prices (house prices 
and shares) were overvalued, household debt was particularly high and the financial sector is 
very large – employing one in five of the workforce and responsible for more than half of the 
jobs increase since 1995. 
The UK’s private savings ratio (the proportion of private disposable income that is not spent) 
fell from 12% in the early 1990s to zero in 2008, but jumped to 9% in 2009.2 An important 
reason for the decline in savings rates was the growth in house prices. Household net worth 
fell from £7.5 trillion to £6.6 trillion between 2007 and 2008, which is a fall from £375,000 
to £330,000 – more than a year’s income.  
 
External imbalances and sterling 
With low savings rates and stable investment of around 15% of GDP, the boom was 
accompanied and funded by a current account deficit. For the past 20 years, the UK ran trade 
deficits most years ranging around 3% of GDP in recent years (see Figure 3). Historical 
experience shows that deep recessions caused by financial crises tend to end with export 
booms.3 While sterling significantly weakened during the crisis and the current account 
deficit initially narrowed to 1.5% of GDP in 2008, it then widened to 2% in 2009 and the 
trade deficit has widened further in the first few months of 2010. 
 
Figure 3: Current account deficit as a percentage of GDP (bars, left-hand scale) and 
Effective Exchange Rate Index (line, right-hand scale) 
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Source: Bank of England and IMF World Economic Outlook. 
                                                 
2 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/tsdataset.asp?vlnk=221&More=N&All=Y. 
3 IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO), April 2009. 
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Public finances: deficits and debt 
 
From 1997 to 2007, the public deficit was reduced by Labour by about 1.1 percentage points 
of GDP. Government spending increased dramatically after 2000, raising the share of public 
spending in GDP to 41.1%, an increase of 1.2 percentage points. These have improved 
outcomes in health, education and crime.4 But Labour also increased tax revenues by 2.3 
percentage points to 38.7% of GDP.5  
Since 2007, tax revenues have followed the zigzag pattern of GDP but government spending 
has continued along a rising path. This has opened up a gap between expenditure and revenue 
equalling around 10% of GDP (see Figure 4). 
In thinking about the current fiscal deficit, three factors are important: 
First, during recessions, tax revenues decline and government expenditures rise due to 
‘automatic stabilisers’. Unemployment benefits and other forms of social spending tend to 
increase while revenues decline more than proportionally due to the progressivity of the tax 
code. This automatically re-adjusts as the economy recovers. 
Second, governments may increase expenditures and reduce tax rates through temporary 
discretionary policies, aimed at counteracting the recession or limiting its social costs. This 
also reflects a temporary component of the deficit insofar as the discretionary measures 
undertaken are truly temporary. The reduction in the VAT rate has already been reversed. 
The deferral of business taxes has not only been reversed, but will contribute to added 
revenues in 2010-12. On the other hand, the discretionary increases in expenditures involved 
across-the-board increases in public expenditures that may be more difficult politically to 
reverse. 
 
Figure 4: Budget spending and receipts 
 
Source: HM Treasury. Current spending and public sector total receipts, in £ billion 
 
Third, a permanent decline in output causes a permanent decrease in tax receipts, requiring a 
commensurate decrease in expenditures, if long-term budget balance is to be achieved.  
                                                 
4 See CEP Election Analyses in each area (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/series.asp?prog=CEPEA). 
5 HM Treasury, Public Finances Databank, March 2010. 
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This has the most significant long-term impact, as it implies a permanent increase in the 
deficit. Estimates of the 2009-10 structural deficit range from 7.8% to 9%, second only to 
Ireland among advanced economies.6 
On the other hand, public sector wages have historically matched the trends of private sector 
wages and are therefore likely to decline in upcoming years. Thus the structural deficit may 
overstate the actual fiscal difficulties that the UK will face. 
The main consequence of high deficits is an increase in public indebtedness. The recent 
sequence of large government deficits has been funded by borrowing from financial markets, 
thereby increasing total government debt. During its first decade in power, the Labour 
government kept net public debt below 40% of GDP, but it is now projected to increase to 
76% of GDP by 2014 (see Figure 5). Only around one tenth of that increase is due to 
financial sector interventions; most is due to the permanent fall in tax revenue while 
government expenditure has continued to rise.  
There has been considerable argument over whether the UK will suffer because of its large 
debt and how urgently the government should attempt to close the deficit. The answer turns 
largely on how financial markets perceive the future credibility of the UK in repaying this 
debt. 
In 2009, the UK had the second highest budget deficit among the members of the G7 (11% of 
GDP; the United States was first with 12%). In contrast, net debt has remained relatively low 
(44% of GDP in 2009) and even in 2014, when UK debt is projected to hit 76%, it will have 
much less debt than Italy or Japan (at 125% and 143% respectively).7  
Perhaps because of this, at present markets seem to be fairly sanguine: the government is 
currently able to borrow for 10 years at 4%, a low interest rate by historical standards and a 
rate no different from what has been available to the government since the mid-1990s. 
Spreads between interest rates on UK bonds relative to US or German bonds are 
insignificant.8 
Short-term interest rates are significantly lower than they have been at any time in recent 
history due to the effectively zero short-term interest rate set by the Bank of England. 
Inflation expectations have also been low during the crisis, implying limited market concern 
that the real size of government debt will be reduced through the use of inflation. But 
inflation expectations have risen and currently stand at close to 3.5%.  
There is some economic evidence that deficits affect yields on government debt even after 
controlling for the total stock of debt,9 as deficits tend to be persistent and politically difficult 
to unwind. The IMF estimates that the UK government will need to run structural budget 
surpluses of 5% throughout the 2020s to bring the public debt stock down to 60% of GDP. 
This would require a 12.8 percentage point adjustment in the structural deficit as a proportion 
of GDP in the upcoming decade – one of the largest fiscal adjustments in recent history.10 
                                                 
6 Estimates from IMF (2009), and the 2009 Pre-Budget Report. 
7 Data from the IMF’s WEO, October 2009. 
8 See Figure 6 in IMF (2009). 
9 IMF (2009). 
10 Table 9 in IMF (2009). 
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Figure 5: Net public debt, historical and projections (percentage of GDP) 
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Source: HM Treasury Public Finance Database  
 
Another potential required adjustment is in the maturity of public debt. The maturity of 
outstanding debt has shortened with short-maturity gilts now comprising close to 20% of 
gross public debt, compared with 15% in the recent past. This may reflect the Treasury’s 
desire to take advantage of low short-term interest rates. But modest increases in interest rates 
could significantly increase the cost of maintaining this level of debt.  
 
 
Policy options and party proposals  
 
The medium term: To the end of the next parliament and beyond 
In the 2009 and 2010 Budgets, Labour announced long-term plans to resolve the deficit by (a) 
halving capital expenditure between 2009 and 2012; (b) reducing general departmental 
funding by 2% a year from April 2011 (compared with historical growth of around 4%); and 
(c) from April 2011, introducing a 50% income tax bracket on earnings exceeding £150,000 
and restricting tax allowances for those over £100,000. Labour also announced a public wage 
freeze for high-income public employees. 
The Conservatives have proposed11 (a) a one-year public pay freeze in 2011; (b) bringing 
forward the date at which the state pension age starts to rise to 66 to no earlier than 2016 for 
men and 2020 for women; (c) stopping tax credits to families with incomes over £50,000; (d) 
cutting spending on Child Trust Funds for all but the poorest third of families and families 
with disabled children; and (e) balancing the structural current budget by the end of the 
forecasting horizon (2015-16). 
A more detailed analysis of the parties’ specific proposals and other deficit reduction options 
is in Table 1. There is substantial overlap in the macroeconomic policies of all parties: all are 
proposing stringent cuts to the deficit. The government is proposing to stablise the debt to 
                                                 
11 http://media.conservatives.s3.amazonaws.com/manifesto/cpmanifesto2010_hires.pdf, p.8. 
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GDP ratio in 2016/17 whereas the Conservatives say they will do it a year earlier by 2015/16. 
The government is proposing to split the deficit reduction one third in tax rises and two thirds 
in spending cuts, whereas the Conservatives would do one fifth in taxes and four fifths in 
spending cuts.  
These plans are not specific enough to be credible. The Liberal Democrats have identified 
more concrete savings (such as not replacing Trident) but even these amount to only £6.5 
billion. They have also pledged to increase personal allowances to £10,000, which would 
give away £16.8 billion in 2011/12. This would be paid for by various other tax measures, 
such as ‘anti-avoidance’ measures, which realists would argue are highly unlikely to work. 
 
The short run: what happens over the next year? 
Even though most pain has been deferred until after the election, the government has started 
to tighten the fiscal belt this year, for example, by increasing taxes on those over £100,000, 
withdrawing the VAT reduction and reducing capital expenditure. Some economists have 
voiced concerns that the required adjustment in the structural deficit is so large that some 
immediate measures must be taken to lower the deficit. Others worry that starting the cuts too 
soon (say in 2010/11) could push the UK back into a recession.12 
The Conservatives have been arguing for swifter action to reduce the deficit, but the concrete 
measures proposed amount to a reduction of only £6 billion in spending in 2010/11 compared 
with Labour. On top of this, they propose to restrict the planned increases in employer’s 
National Insurance from 2011, which will lead to lower tax revenues of £6 billion. The magic 
circle is squared through pointing to an additional £12 billion of ‘efficiency’ savings. The 
government itself has pencilled in £11 billion of these for 2011, but we should be sceptical – 
efficiencies are elusive and hard to achieve.  
In any case, a reduction of spending remains just that, whether achieved ‘painlessly’ through 
efficiency gains or more painfully from a fall in the quality of public services. It will reduce 
demand and endanger the recovery if it really is so fragile. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
There are initial signs of recovery from the deep recession of 2008 to 2009. But the recovery 
may be slow and there is still no sign of a significant reversal in the current account deficits 
that the UK has run for the past two decades. These problems may be compounded by large 
deficits and the medium-term challenge of public debt reduction. 
All parties have been vociferous in their rhetoric on public debt reduction. Deficit and debt 
reduction will be painful, with the agony unequally distributed across the electorate. The 
parties have articulated specific targets and piecemeal measures to address the public debt 
challenge, but no party has put forward a comprehensive plan to address the structural deficit 
challenges that are likely to be central to the economic policy agenda of the elected 
government. 
 
April 2010 
                                                 
12 For example, see the exchange of letters between 80 economists in the Sunday Times (13 February 2010) and 
the Financial Times (19 February 2010). 
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Table 1: Dealing with the deficit?  
Policy Party proposals Potential impact 
 
INCREASING TAXES 
 
Increasing taxes 
on high-income 
earnings 
From April 2010, there is a new 50% 
income tax bracket, restricted tax 
allowances on pension contributions for 
people earning above £150,000 and 
withdrawal of personal allowances for 
those earning above £100,000. The 
other parties will keep these measures in 
place. 
The 50% income tax bracket is projected to 
yield revenues of approximately 0.1% of GDP 
and thus will not bring a significant long-run 
decrease in the deficit.13 
National 
Insurance 
From April 2011, Labour will increase 
employer and employee National 
Insurance (NI) by 1p. This is combined 
with an increase in the point at which 
lower earners pay NI to  
 £1,170, meaning that low earners will 
pay less NI. The Conservatives will 
restrict the increase in NI so there will 
be less NI levied on workers earning 
under £45,400. 
Labour plans will raise about £6.3 billion, just 
about all of which will be lost under 
Conservative plans.  
Employers’ NI will translate through to lower 
wages.  
Personal 
allowances 
The Liberal Democrats will raise the 
income tax personal allowance to 
£10,000 
This would cost about £16.8 billion in 2011/12 
Increasing the 
VAT rate or 
broadening the 
VAT base 
While VAT is a popular tax among 
economists, due to its relatively non-
distortionary nature, neither party has 
proposed an increase in VAT.  
The VAT rate of 17.5% is below the European 
level of 19.5%, indicating that tax increases on 
this front are feasible. A 3.5% increase in the 
VAT would raise around 1% of GDP in tax 
revenues.14 Broadening the VAT base and 
eliminating exemptions could increase 
revenues by up to 3% of GDP a year. 
Cutting tax 
credits 
The Conservatives have proposed 
stopping tax credits for households 
earning in excess of £50,000.  
This is a relatively progressive way to increase 
tax revenues. But it is likely to yield less than 
£100 million of new revenues.15 
 
                                                 
13 2009 Budget. 
14 IFS (2010). 
15 Author’s estimate: the Treasury estimates that approximately 153,500 with incomes above £50,000 receive 
the Child Tax Credit, some of whom would still receive under the Conservatives’ plan. They receive less than 
the standard rate of £545, putting an upper bound of £82 million on savings due to this proposal.  
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Policy Party proposals Potential impact 
Bank taxes 
The Liberal Democrats will put an 
additional 10% tax on UK banks 
(raising £2.2 billion), the Conservatives 
a £1 billion levy. Labour wants an 
international deal on a financial 
transactions tax. 
Bank taxes levied solely in the UK (as the 
opposition parties propose) could lead to banks 
relocating away from the UK. Crude bank 
taxes by themselves will do little to deal with 
the problem of financial regulation that caused 
the crisis – see CEP Election Analysis on 
Financial Regulation 
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/ea011.pdf). 
 
 
 
Other taxes 
 
 
 
The Liberal Democrats will (i) reform 
air passenger duty and introduce taxes 
for domestic flights (£3.3 billion); (ii) 
introduce 1% tax on domestic property 
values over £2 million (‘mansion tax’) – 
£1.7 billion; (iii) reduce capital gains 
allowances (£1.9 billion). 
 
 
CUTTING GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES 
 
Public sector 
wages  
Labour and the Conservatives have 
proposed public sector pay freezes. The 
Conservatives have also proposed 
capping public sector pensions for 
public employees with earnings in 
excess of £50,000. The Liberal 
Democrats have proposed a £400 pay 
raise cap for all public employees. 
When public expenditures cuts are necessary 
during recessions, public wage freezes or cuts 
are particularly attractive options. They help 
cut government expenditure in real terms but 
have more limited macroeconomic and social 
costs relative to cutting public good provision 
or public investment. They may lower the 
fiscal deficit with a limited reduction in the 
provision of public goods; at the same time, 
they do not add workers to the unemployment 
pool and public workers are less likely to leave 
public service for private sector jobs. The long-
run fiscal benefit of such cuts depends on 
whether they cause a permanent decline in 
public wages. Labour’s wage freeze is 
projected to reduce expenditures cumulatively 
by 0.2% of GDP, which has a negligible effect 
on long-run debt and will only have a small 
and temporary impact on the budget deficit.  
Slowing the 
growth of public 
expenditures 
Labour has proposed cutting 
departmental funding by 2% a year in 
real terms in 2011 to 2014 and halving 
public investments. The Conservatives 
have proposed cutting spending on 
Child Trust Funds for all but the poorest 
third of families and families with 
disabled children. Liberal Democrats 
have proposed to end government 
payments into Child Trust Funds. 
Labour’s proposal could have a significant 
impact on public debt, but lacks specifics in 
how such radical cuts will be achieved. Drastic 
cuts in public investments could have an 
impact on economic growth in the medium 
term. 
Structural policies 
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Policy Party proposals Potential impact 
Increasing the 
retirement age 
The Turner review, overseen by the 
Blair government in 2004, proposes 
increasing women’s retirement age to 
65 by 2020 and raise both sexes’ 
retirement age to 66 in 2026.16 The 
Conservatives have proposed bringing 
forward the date at which the state 
pension age starts to rise to 66, to no 
earlier than 2016 for men and 2020 for 
women.  
It is estimated that increasing the full pension 
age to 68 for men and women by 2030 would 
give (cumulative) savings of 0.6% of GDP. As 
this reform is more ambitious than proposed by 
either party, it gives an upper bound to the 
potential revenues that are available through 
pension reform. 
 
BUDGETARY INSTITUTIONS 
 
Fiscal rules 
versus fiscal 
committees 
Both parties have considered 
institutional arrangements that might 
help control deficits in the future and 
serve as a check on the Treasury in the 
budgetary process. Labour’s approach 
has been ‘rule-based’ in that it attempts 
to limit future deficits through a form of 
fiscal rule. In February, Labour passed a 
Fiscal Stability Act, which updated the 
draft Code for Fiscal Stability.17 The 
Conservatives have instead proposed an 
institutional arrangement in the form of 
a Budgetary Responsibility Committee, 
which would produce medium-term 
budget forecasts and assess the long-
term sustainability of the public 
finances.18 
There is limited economic research on the 
relative advantages of rules and committees in 
the fiscal process. IMF research has shown that 
fiscal rules have been helpful in fiscal 
consolidation, but do not compare rules to the 
alternative proposal.19 The common argument 
in favour of a fiscal council is that it allows 
some discretion (based ideally on professional 
expertise rather than political considerations) in 
reacting to new conditions. Another argument 
is that it is very common for fiscal rules to be 
violated.20 Proponents of institutional 
arrangements argue that the force of the moral 
suasion of a fiscal council exceeds the quasi-
legal force of a fiscal rule. Proponents of a 
fiscal rule argue that it provides a clear target 
and that an institution like a fiscal council is 
likely to be subject to political pressure.  
In practical terms, the devil is likely to be in 
the details. The effectiveness of a fiscal 
committee depends on its institutional 
structure, authority, and degree of 
independence. The effectiveness of a fiscal rule 
depends on enforcement mechanisms. 
 
                                                 
16 http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/oct/06/retirement-age-david-cameron. 
17 http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/fiscal_stability_draft_code.pdf. 
18 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8b4fa40e-fa4c-11de-beed-00144feab49a,s01=1.html. 
19 IMF (2009). 
20 Think of the case of Greece: officially it was bound by the eurozone’s Stability and Growth Pact, which limits 
deficits to 3% of GDP, but in practice Greece ran deficits in excess of 9% and has violated the terms of the pact 
every year. 
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ELECTION ANALYSIS 
Urban Renewal and Regional Growth: 
Muddled Objectives and Mixed Progress 
• Since 1997, Labour has committed to improve the UK’s ‘underperforming’ 
neighbourhoods, cities and regions.  
• The public service agreement on regional growth commits the government to ‘improve 
the economic performance of all English regions and reduce the gap in economic growth 
rates between regions’. There is little evidence of significant progress against this 
objective. 
• The role played by the regional development agencies (RDAs) is hard to assess. There is 
no compelling evidence on whether RDAs are a good or bad thing. 
• The government has also committed considerable resources to trying to improve 
outcomes in deprived neighbourhoods. Expenditures have provided important public 
goods, for example, improved social housing. But there appears to have been little 
progress in narrowing the gap between the outcomes for the most seriously disadvantaged 
individuals and the rest. 
• As with RDA expenditure, it is difficult to get compelling evidence on the impact of these 
initiatives. Based on the best evidence that we have available (for the New Deal for 
Communities), a reasonably well-funded ‘area-based initiative’ has not, on average, 
improved individual outcomes in targeted areas. 
• Some argue that there can be no assumption that ‘success’ is best measured by what 
happens to individuals as opposed to what happens to areas. Most economists would 
disagree with this suggestion: they view improving places as a means to an end rather 
than as an end in itself. 
• Understandably, constituency-based politicians often care about area outcomes 
irrespective of the effect on individuals. Add to this the fact that voluntary ‘sorting’ in 
response to initiatives makes their impact very hard to evaluate and it is clear why the 
thinking of all political parties on the objectives for – and effectiveness of – spatial policy 
remains muddled. 
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Introduction 
 
Since its election in 1997, the Labour government has been committed to improving the 
fortunes of the UK’s ‘underperforming’ neighbourhoods, cities and regions. It has used a 
complex array of policy initiatives to try to achieve this objective.  
This Election Analysis considers the evidence on the effects of some of these initiatives, with 
a focus on the role of ‘area-based initiatives’, which try to improve outcomes in particular 
areas. It also considers the overall impacts. 
The evidence suggests that progress against objectives has been mixed. This is unsurprising. 
The economic processes that drive spatial differences are poorly understood and what 
evidence we do have has played little part in the formulation of policy. As a result, there is 
confusion about what urban and regional policy could and should try to achieve. This 
confusion is shared by all political parties. 
 
 
Regional policy 
 
Places throughout the UK – regions, cities and neighbourhoods – appear very unequal. This is 
true if we look at average earnings, employment, education and almost any other socio-
economic outcome. 
For example, in 2005, in terms of gross value added (GVA) per person, the highest ranked 
(NUTS 3) regions in the UK were West Inner London and Berkshire with GVAs of £44,050 
and £39,850 respectively. The lowest ranked were Liverpool and Blackpool, with GVAs that 
were half of those in London and Berkshire: £19,800 and £21,050. 
These individual examples are representative of a broader trend – the top ranked 10% of UK 
(NUTS 3) regions have GVA at least 50% higher than the bottom ranked 10%. 
The public service agreement on regional growth commits the government to ‘improve the 
economic performance of all English regions and reduce the gap in economic growth rates 
between regions’. To help achieve this objective in England, the government created regional 
development agencies (RDAs) in 1999.1 The devolved administrations all have agencies with 
broadly similar objectives. 
There is little evidence of significant progress against this objective. The most recent 
assessment (August 2009) by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), 
reports ‘some progress’. Between 2002 and 2007, five regions improved on baseline (1990-
2002) while four regions saw weaker growth. 
In terms of narrowing differences in growth rates, assessment is based on the gap between the 
Greater South East and the North, Midlands and South West. Again, comparing up to 2007 
against the 1990s baseline suggests a small improvement: the gap has fallen from 0.6 to 0.5 
percentage points. But add in the 2008 downturn and the gap rises to 0.7.2 
                                                 
1 The London Development Agency was created in 2000. 
2 Data taken from ‘Key Indicators’ (http://stats.berr.gov.uk/reppsa2/), accessed 25/01/10. 
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The role played by the RDAs in these developments is hard to assess. 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers found that every £1 spent by the RDAs added £4.50 to regional 
GVA. These numbers seem very high, reflecting the fact that the evaluation almost certainly 
attributes things to RDA activities when they (or something else that generates value) would 
have happened regardless. 
Estimating the ‘additionality’ of government interventions is difficult. But it would be fair to 
say that the approach adopted by most evaluations of RDA expenditures (asking project 
managers or recipients) is close to the bottom of the ranking in terms of rigour. 
In short, there is no compelling evidence as to whether the RDAs are a good or bad thing. 
Labour is committed to them; the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats are (probably) 
committed to abolishing them. It should be clear that these positions cannot truly reflect 
evidence-based positions on RDAs’ effectiveness. 
The Conservatives’ concerns are mostly around RDAs’ new regional planning role (they 
think powers should rest with local authorities) and the fact that they are unelected ‘quangos’. 
The Liberal Democrats share concerns about accountability, but say that they will look at 
value-for-money on a case-by-case basis. 
 
 
Deprived neighbourhoods 
 
Turning to smaller neighbourhoods, the government has again committed considerable 
resources to trying to improve outcomes. The National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal 
(2001) focused on deprived neighbourhoods and aimed to ensure that within 10 to 20 years, 
no one would be seriously disadvantaged by where they live. 
As well as directing mainstream funding, specific programmes have been associated with this 
objective: the New Deal for Communities (NDC), the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF) 
and, slightly later, Housing Market Renewal Pathfinders. New initiatives continue to appear, 
for example, the Working Neighbourhoods Fund. Unsurprisingly, given the complexity and 
the state of government finances, we do not know what the policy mix in this area will look 
like in the next parliament.  
Working out the overall impact on deprived neighbourhoods from existing interventions is 
difficult. Expenditures have clearly provided important public goods to deprived areas, for 
example, in the form of improved social housing and public spaces. 
But aside from the consumption value of these goods, there appears to have been little 
progress in narrowing the gap between the outcomes for the most seriously disadvantaged 
individuals and the rest.3  
Of course, this does not mean that policy has had no impact: things may have been worse 
without them. But as with RDA expenditure, it is difficult to get compelling evidence on the 
impact of these initiatives.4 
                                                 
3 National Equality Panel (2010). 
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The evaluation of the NDC is more rigorous.5 The NDC is a 10-year policy, which spends 
£400 per household per year in 39 of the most deprived areas of the country. Evidence on its 
impact to date is disappointing. According to the summary of the recent evaluation: 
‘NDC areas are experiencing positive change, some of which is over and above that 
occurring in the comparator areas.’ Specifically, ‘[a]fter controlling for base 
characteristics, residents in NDC areas have on average seen statistically greater 
positive change in relation to their satisfaction with the area compared with 
comparator residents […]. This is not, however, the case when a respondent’s initial 
level of satisfaction is included.’ 
In the full report, it appears that (controlling for socio-demographic factors) individuals in 
NDC areas did worse on between two and seven out of 15 indicators (depending on the time 
period). In other words, based on the best available evidence, a reasonably well-funded area 
policy has not, on average, improved individual outcomes in targeted areas. 
The report leaves some wriggle room. There may be area policies in the comparison areas 
that are just as successful – although it seems unlikely that they could be as costly as the 
NDC. It is also early days for the NDC – although the evaluation also suggests that the largest 
gains came first. 
The report itself suggests that: 
‘There can be no assumption that “success” is best measured in relation to what 
happens to individuals as opposed to what happens to these areas over time’. 
This argument is simply baffling. If such policies have equity objectives – for example, 
helping the disadvantaged – then we should care about what happens to individuals not areas. 
The fact that the NDC evaluation can suggest the exact opposite highlights confusion about 
what urban and regional policy could and should try to achieve. 
 
 
What can and should spatial policy do? 
 
As should be clear, the evidence on the impact of UK area policies is mixed and there is 
certainly scope for improving the rigour of the methods used to assess the impact of policy. 
Unfortunately, the situation is not much better looking outside the UK.  
For example, two recent evaluations of Empowerment Zones in the United States go some 
way towards addressing methodological concerns. But while one of them finds large positive 
effects of the zones, the other finds almost no effects.6  
A recent study provides a useful summary of existing US evidence.7 It suggests that: 
                                                                                                                                                        
4 For example, the recent evaluation of the NRF states that: ‘There is very limited data available to evidence 
outcomes at a local level. Therefore we provide comment on who benefited from NRF based on how funds have 
been targeted and stakeholder perceptions of the outcomes arising.’ 
5 See http://extra.shu.ac.uk/ndc/.   
6 See Busso et al (2009) and Kolko and Neumark (2009). 
7 Bartik (2003). 
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(i) Tax incentives seem to work and are most effective at redistributing within 
urban areas. But they are costly and easily offset if labour or land costs in poorer 
areas are kept relatively high (as a result of, for example, national pay-setting or 
local land regulations). 
(ii) ‘Extension’ activities to improve productivity through, for example, 
benchmarking can be relatively cost-effective. 
(iii) There is limited evidence on the benefits of ‘cluster’ approaches or focusing on 
high-technology industries.  
(iv) The evidence for targeting small businesses is not particularly compelling 
because so many of these businesses sell locally so displacement of existing 
businesses is a real risk. 
(v) Evidence on Enterprise Zones or other policies targeted at deprived 
neighbourhoods is mixed. 
In the light of this mixed evidence base on the effectiveness of many interventions, some 
economists have begun to argue for trying alternative approaches. One possibility is to try to 
address the problem that relatively expensive land and labour costs provide a disincentive for 
firms to relocate activity to deprived neighbourhoods.  
In the UK, national pay structures for public sector workers ensure that their salaries do not 
show as much spatial variation as private sector wages. Given that the public sector is 
disproportionately large in deprived areas (for example, it is approximately 32% in 
Newcastle, 36% in Liverpool and 42% in Hastings compared with 27% for the GB 
average), these higher public sector wages may crowd out private sector employment. 
The Conservatives’ manifesto (and subsequent interviews with David Cameron) have 
emphasised the need to increase the share of the private sector in some areas. Interestingly, 
while the Conservatives appear to be suggesting that public sector employment crowds out 
private sector employment in deprived areas, the recent Smith report for HM Treasury 
assumes the opposite (so that moving jobs out of affluent areas has no effect on employment 
because they are simply replaced by private sector jobs).8 Unfortunately, there is essentially 
no evidence available to distinguish between these claims. 
National pay structures also have a variable impact on the quality of public services across 
regions. Propper and Van Reenen (2010) show that the national pay system in the NHS 
decreases service quality (as measured by hospital death rates) in high cost areas, such as 
London, without increasing quality much in the low cost areas. 
Land use controls that make commercial property expensive in deprived areas also act to 
reduce employment further. For example, commercial rents in Birmingham are twice those in 
San Francisco. This is mostly because Birmingham’s planning restrictions are more 
restrictive than San Francisco, itself a highly regulated city by US standards.9  
                                                 
8 Smith (2010). 
9 Cheshire and Hilber (2008). 
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Another possibility, although one that is even less popular with politicians than suggestions to 
liberalise land planning, is to encourage greater mobility out of deprived areas.10  
 
 
Understanding what drives spatial disparities 
 
Given the conflicting evidence base, one thing that is needed is much greater clarity about the 
way spatial disparities arise and what, if anything, policy should do about them. Here, the 
academic research literature can help. Spatial policy at all scales is largely based around 
concerns about ‘area inequalities’. But area outcomes are simply aggregates of the outcomes 
for people who live and work in these places. 
Without further information, we do not know whether the economic outcomes for people 
currently living in West London would be any different if they lived and worked in 
Newcastle. We have no way of knowing if the productivity of West London and Newcastle 
would change if these movements of people took place. Similarly, we do not know whether 
replicating the economic, policy, institutional and environmental regime of West London in 
Newcastle would change anything without moving people. 
In short, while it is relatively easy to measure aggregate economic differences between 
places, it is much harder to work out what these differences mean in terms of the economic 
advantages and disadvantages that a place offers to the people who live and work there. 
It is also easy to assume from looking at these overall figures for different areas, that 
inequalities between places are big drivers of individual inequality. But this clearly need not 
be the case. For individuals, the differences between those living and working within the 
same local area may far exceed the differences between the average worker in different areas. 
Knowing whether ‘between-place’ inequalities or ‘within-place’ inequalities dominate is thus 
crucial to understanding the role that spatial policy might play in addressing individual 
inequality. Evidence increasingly points to the fact that within-place inequalities play a much 
more important role than between-place inequalities. 
Even when we are able to address between-place inequalities (for example, through 
improving public spaces in specific areas), the location decisions of individuals, coupled with 
the working of the housing market, often mean that poorer individuals quickly become priced 
out of much improved areas. 
This is one of the key reasons why economists tend to argue for a policy focus on people over 
place.11 That is, they argue for viewing improving places as a means to an end rather than as 
an end in itself. From this viewpoint, it would be very odd to see as successful a policy that 
improved average outcomes in a neighbourhood simply by moving out some of the 
disadvantaged inhabitants. 
Unfortunately, but unsurprisingly, constituency-based politicians (from both local and 
national government) sometimes care about area outcomes irrespective of the effect on 
individuals. Add to this the fact that voluntary sorting in response to initiatives makes impact 
                                                 
10 Leunig and Swaffield (2008). 
11 See, for example, Glaeser and Gottleib (2008). 
105 
 
very hard to evaluate, and it is clear why the thinking of all political parties on the objectives 
for – and effectiveness of – spatial policy remain muddled. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The Labour government has spent considerable sums trying to narrow the gap between poor 
areas – neighbourhoods, cities and regions – and the rest. We have very little compelling 
evidence on the impact of these initiatives. 
This means that the parties’ positions on regional and urban economic policy tend to be based 
on belief rather than evidence. In addition, policy is often confused about why we care about 
spatial disparities and what, if anything, will be the impact on individuals of addressing them. 
 
April 2010 
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ELECTION ANALYSIS 
 
 
Inequality: Still Higher, But Labour’s Policies Kept it Down 
 
• Overall income and wage inequality has risen dramatically in the UK over the last 
three decades. Although the fastest increase was during the 1980s, there was still 
some (small) increase after 1997. 
 
• In 1979, a man in full-time work at the 90th percentile (10% from the top of the 
distribution) earned 2.5 times more per week than a man at the 10th percentile (10% 
from the bottom of the distribution). In 2009, the equivalent figure was 3.7 times 
more per week. 
 
• The increase in wage inequality between 1980 and 1990 was much stronger in the UK 
and the United States than elsewhere. Since 2000, there have been increases in 
inequality across all richer countries (except France). 
 
• Inequality is a tale of two halves. The top half of the wage distribution has continued 
to become more unequal steadily throughout the last three decades. The bottom half 
of the wage distribution ceased to become more unequal after 1997.  
 
• The top 1% of the population has become considerably richer and this has had a large 
effect on the ‘Gini coefficient’, a widely used measure of overall inequality. In the 
decade since 1998, most of this change has been driven by the financial sector, 
especially bankers’ bonuses. 
 
• The changes in tax and spending policies that the Labour government has introduced 
since 1997 have significantly redistributed income to the less well off. Inequality 
would have been much higher otherwise.  
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Introduction 
 
The Labour party came to power in 1997 partly in response to the sense that inequality had 
risen too much under 18 years of Conservative rule. So it must have been deeply shocking to 
many in the Labour party when David Cameron announced during the 2009 Conservative 
party conference that inequality had risen since 1997.  
So what has happened? Individuals’ pre-tax and benefit incomes mainly come from their 
activities in the labour market – that is, their wages. The government has some influence on 
these sources, for example, through minimum wage policies. But the government has a much 
greater influence through changing the tax and benefit system, which generally redistributes 
towards the poor and away from the wealthier.  
 
 
The rise in UK wage inequality: a tale of two halves 
 
Figure 1 displays the evolution since 1970 of the 90-10 earnings differential for men and 
women in full-time work. The figure of 0.9 in 1979 means that a man at the 90th percentile 
(just in the richest tenth of workers) earned 2.5 times (0.9 log points) more than a man at the 
10th percentile (just in the poorest tenth of workers). By 2009, the richer man would earn 3.7 
times (1.3 log points) more than the poorer man.  
 
Figure 1: Difference in wages between the richest tenth and poorest tenth (90-10 log 
weekly earnings ratios), full-time men and women, 1970-2009 
.8
.9
1
1.
1
1.
2
1.
3
Lo
g 
Ea
rn
in
gs
 R
at
io
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
FT Men Log 90/10 Ratio FT Women Log 90/10 Ratio
 
Source: Machin (2010): National Equality Panel Analysis; 1968-96 New Earnings Survey (NES) and 1997-2009 
Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) 
Figure 2 considers the upper and lower halves of the distribution separately. For men, the top 
half of the wage ladder (measured by the 90-50 wage ratio) rises sharply from the late 1970s, 
and this continues consistently throughout the entire period up until 2009. By contrast, the 
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bottom half of the wage distribution (measured by the 50-10 wage ratio) increases until the 
mid-1990s and then flattens out.1 The story for women from Figure 1 and 2 is similar to that 
for men, although the rise is inequality is more muted.  
 
Figure 2: Upper half (90-50 log earnings ratio) and lower half (50-10 log earnings ratio) 
inequality, full-time men and women, 1970-2009 
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Source: Machin (2010) 
 
 
After 1990, wage inequality rises throughout the richer countries 
 
Table 1 shows data on male 90-10 wage ratios in 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2008 (or the 
closest year to that) for 12 countries. As is well known, during the 1980s, the United States 
and the UK stand out as having a very large increase in wage inequality. 
By contrast, over the period 1990-2008, every country has experienced some increase in 
wage inequality (with the exception of France). Although the UK has the third highest level 
                                                 
1 Similar patterns are evident in other data sources. Brewer et al (2009) find that in the 2000s, the Family 
Resources Survey suggests that the 50-10 differential is constant for full-time men and actually falls by 0.3 
percentage points a year (up to 2008) for full-time women.  
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of inequality at the end of the period, the magnitude of the increase in pay gaps since 1990 is 
in line with the OECD averages. 
 
Table 1: Male 90-10 wage ratios across countries, 1970-2008 
  
1970 
 
 
1980 
 
1990 
 
2000 
 
2008 
 
Australia 
 
2.4a 
 
2.7 
 
2.7 
 
3.1 
 
3.5 
Denmark  2.1 2.2 2.5 2.7e 
Finland - 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.6e 
France 3.7 3.3 3.3 3.0 2.9d 
Germany - 2.5b 2.5 2.8 2.9d 
Japan 2.6 a 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.9 
Netherlands - 2.3 b 2.5 2.9 2.9d 
New Zealand - 2.2 2.5 2.7 3.1 
South Korea - 4.1 b 3.2 3.7 4.7 
Sweden 2.2 a 2.1 2.1 2.4 2.4c 
UK 2.7 2.7 3.3 3.4 3.7 
United States 3.4 3.6 4.4 4.8 
 
5.0 
Source: OECD Stat Extracts website, http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx. Data are from different years to the 
column header for some countries a – 1975; b – 1984; c – 2004; d – 2005; e – 2007 
This suggests that there are similar global underlying forces driving up inequality. The fact 
that the supply of education has risen alongside increased wages for the university educated 
indicates that there has been an increase in the demand for skills. The obvious culprits are 
new technologies, which skilled workers find easier to use, or increased competition with 
developing countries like China. 
Machin and Van Reenen (1998, 2008) have argued that increases in the demand for skills are 
mainly due to new technologies, such as information and communication technologies (ICT). 
For example, throughout the developed world, the industries that have experienced the 
greatest increase in the demand for skills are also those that invested the most in ICT, not 
those with the greatest exposure to trade (Michaels et al, 2010). 
On top of these structural factors, labour market policies can make a difference. The decline 
in unions and the fall in the real value of the minimum wage undoubtedly accelerated the 
increase in inequality in the United States and the UK in the 1980s. Similarly, the 
introduction of the UK’s first National Minimum Wage in 1999 helped those near the bottom 
of the wage ladder. 
 
 
Polarisation 
 
Figure 3 shows that increasingly, the middle group of workers is losing out to those at the 
bottom end and the top end. There is very rapid employment growth over time in the top two 
deciles of job quality (as measured by median occupational wages in 1979). Employment 
actually fell in the middle deciles but grew in the bottom decile.  
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Figure 3: Polarisation of the UK labour market, 1979-2008 
 
Source: Mieske (2009); percentage changes are for the entire period 
 
 
Household income 
 
Household net income is a better measure than wages of the resources available to families 
for consumption (for example, it takes taxes and benefits into account). Figure 4 shows the 
trends for the Gini coefficient, which is an overall measure of inequality equal to 1 for 
complete inequality and zero for complete equality. Like wages, this shows some edging up 
of inequality under Labour, but nothing like the huge rise in the 1980s. 
The Gini coefficient is heavily influenced by income growth among the top 10% of the 
distribution, and with more rapid income growth the higher the percentile point. Bell and Van 
Reenen (2010) show that the richest 1% of the population have increased their share of total 
income from 10% to 13% between 1998 and 2008, and this was mainly due to bonuses for 
financial sector workers. 
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Figure 4: Trends in household income inequality, 1979-2008, Gini coefficient 
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Source: IFS, http://www.ifs.org.uk/bns/bn19figs.zip, as used in Figure 2.13 of NEP (2010) 
Figure 5 splits the income inequality trends into upper and lower halves, as Figure 2 did for 
wages. Unlike wages, the difference between the top half of the household income 
distribution did not continue to rise after the 1980s; in fact, it seemed to fall somewhat from 
the mid-1990s. Could Labour’s policies be having a redistributive effect, mitigating the 
secular increase in wage inequality? 
 
 
What has been the effect of Labour on inequality? 
 
The fact that inequality of the bottom half of the wage distribution and top half of the income 
distribution stopped growing after 1997 is suggestive of a policy shift. In terms of low wages, 
the main effect is likely to have been the National Minimum Wage introduced in 1999, which 
appears to have had a large effect in raising the wages of low earners without many 
appreciable negative effects on jobs (see Stewart, 2010). 
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Figure 5: Household income, trends in household upper half (90-50) and lower half (50-
10) income inequality, 1970-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IFS, http://www.ifs.org.uk/bns/bn19figs.zip, as used in Figure 2.13 of NEP (2010)  
For net household income, there have been many policies aimed at redistribution: 
 
• the working families tax credit (now the Child and Working Tax Credits), an 
in-work benefit; 
• increases in benefits levels, especially for families with children such as lone 
parents; 
• increases in taxation on the relatively better off, such as the abolition of the 
upper earnings limit for individual National Insurance; 
• more generous increases in pensions (for example, the Pensions Credit); 
• and expansion of personal allowances, which disproportionately benefits those 
on lower earnings. 
 
It is complex to factor in all these changes, but the report of the National Equality Panel 
(2010) attempted to do so. Figure 6 illustrates what the overall distributional effects of tax 
and benefit policy changes have been comparing 2008 with 1997. 
This is done by making an assumption about how policies would have evolved in the absence 
of the Labour government. The net effect of changes introduced by the previous Conservative 
policies 1979-97 was to redistribute income towards richer groups (for example, the 
reduction of the highest 60% marginal rate of taxation to 40%). 
But a fairer benchmark is perhaps to assume that benefits would simply have risen with 
prices. The darker shaded columns show that the sum of Labour’s policies implies substantial 
increases in distribution towards poorer people. The bottom tenth is 25% better off under 
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Labour’s policies than they would have been under the ‘business as usual’ case of benefits 
simply rising with prices.  
 
Figure 6: Overall distributional effects of Labour’s tax benefit policies 1996/97 to 
2007/08 compared with price and earnings indexation (percentage change in disposable 
income) 
 
 
An alternative benchmark would be to assume that benefits rose in line with wages. This 
certainly has not been the stated aim of the Conservatives, but may be more realistic. This is 
shown in the lighter shaded columns in Figure 6. There is also much redistribution, but in this 
case the costs to the richer are greater and the benefits to the poorer are smaller. 
Figure 6 does not include the withdrawal in personal allowances for those earning over 
£100,000 nor the new 50% tax rate on those earning over £150,000 (beginning April 2011). 
Although these changes only affect 2% of households, if these were also factored in, then 
there would be much larger losses for the top decile and even more redistribution. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Overall wage and income inequality rose slightly under the Labour government since 1997. 
This was driven by the top half (especially the top 10%) of the income distribution. There 
was no change in inequality (and even falls on some measures) for those in the bottom half of 
the distribution. 
The increase in wage inequality is an international phenomenon driven by increases in the 
demand for more skilled workers. There is relatively little that any government can do about 
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this in the long term: the best policy is to keep improving the skills of the workforce through 
education and training. 
The tax and benefit policies of the Labour governments have meant that inequality is 
considerably lower than it would have been under the previous Conservative administration, 
especially for those in the bottom 20%. 
But since the inequality ‘escalator’ of pre-tax earnings has been moving upwards, the policies 
have at best kept inequality stable rather than significantly reducing it. 
 
 
April 2010 
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ELECTION ANALYSIS 
 
 
Climate Change:  
Consensus on the long-run targets – but will we get policies that deliver? 
 
• To favour action on climate change is part of the political consensus across all major 
parties. All have signed up to legally binding targets for greenhouse gas emissions of 
a 34% reduction by 2022 and an 80% reduction by 2050 relative to 1990 levels.  
 
• In line with the Kyoto protocol, compared with 1990, UK emissions have been 
reduced by more than 12.5%. But the UK has failed to meet its own target of a 20% 
cut by 2010. Things look even worse if the measure of carbon emissions includes 
consumption by UK residents, rather than simply emissions occurring in the UK. 
 
• To meet the targets efficiently, carbon prices must rise. While the UK has various 
policy initiatives to establish such a price signal, the price incurred by different types 
of emitters differs widely. Even the strongest price signals are relatively weak, and 
there is considerable uncertainty about the future path of carbon pricing.  
 
• The reform plans of the Climate Change Levy proposed by the Conservatives and the 
Liberal Democrats would address some of these concerns by creating a floor price for 
the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme. The LibDems’ plans are more 
radical – extending the levy to non-business users. Both parties stop short, however, 
of specifying how high this floor price should be. 
 
• All parties have proposals for ‘clean’ generation technologies with varying levels of 
support depending on the type of technology. Labour and the Conservatives support 
further nuclear power plants whereas the LibDems are opposed to nuclear.  
 
• Giving differential support to different technologies risks inefficiencies and 
unnecessary costs. Support for renewable technologies could be integrated with 
establishing a carbon price. The floor for the carbon price could be indexed to fossil 
fuel prices, both to hedge the risk and to avoid excessive profits in the event of future 
oil price hikes. 
 
• A carbon price will be fiscally regressive and the parties lack practical proposals to 
address this. The simplest measure could be to channel all revenue arising from 
carbon back to UK residents in form of a lump sum rebate – akin to a ‘poll subsidy’. 
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Introduction 
 
To be in favour of action on climate change is clearly in the mainstream. This is reflected not 
only in the policy positions of the parties, but also in construction activity at the party 
leaders’ homes – David Cameron temporarily installed a wind turbine on his house a couple 
of years back while Gordon Brown says he has been experimenting with solar panels. 
Labour’s plans were outlined in a White Paper in 2008, which subsequently led to various 
bills in parliament that were supported by the opposition parties. The Conservatives’ ‘Low 
Carbon Economy Security, Stability and Green Growth’1 and the LibDems’ ‘Zero Carbon 
Britain – Taking a Global Lead’2 papers are often hard to distinguish from similar 
government material.3 But there are some important differences, and a high degree of 
harmony between the parties does not mean that there is no room for improvement.4  
 
 
The performance so far 
 
The overall shape of UK climate change policy is currently outlined by the 2008 Climate 
Change Act, which was backed by the opposition parties. The act requires a 34% reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2022 and an 80% reduction by 2050 relative to 1990 levels.5 
The act was clearly an important milestone both nationally and internationally in climate 
change policy-making in that it made greenhouse gas targets legally binding and established 
an independent expert panel – the Committee on Climate Change6 – to monitor progress 
towards these targets and propose more specific policies needed to meet them. Nevertheless, 
it remains to be seen if the commitment continues as the costs to UK voters increase. 
Compared with 1990, the UK has reduced greenhouse gas emissions by more than 12.5%, 
which is in line with the target under the Kyoto protocol. But the UK has failed to meet a 
separate target – proposed by the government – to reduce carbon emissions by 20% in 2010. 
The performance of the UK looks dramatically worse when taking account of emissions from 
tourism and emissions embedded in trade. Many goods imported to the UK, such as 
manufactured goods from China, are energy-intensive in production, and it makes sense to 
count the emissions that UK residents consume rather than simply the emissions that actually 
arise on UK territory. 
According to some estimates, UK greenhouse gas emissions may have risen by 19% or more 
since 1990. Figure 1 shows the path of greenhouse gases emitted on UK territory as well as 
the implied greenhouse gas emissions caused by UK residents. 
 
                                                 
1 http://www.conservatives.com/~/media/Files/Green%20Papers/Environment_Policy_Paper.ashx?dl=true 
2 http://www.libdems.org.uk/siteFiles/resources/PDF/Zero_Carbon_Britain.pdf. 
3 For example, the ‘Low carbon transition plan’ 
(http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/publications/lc_trans_plan/lc_trans_plan.aspx). 
4 There is also some last minute repositioning. For example, ‘Rebuilding Security – Conservative Energy Policy 
for an Uncertain World’ from Spring 2010 contradicts in parts the strategy outlined in ‘Low Carbon Economy 
Security, Stability and Green Growth’. The remarks in this briefing refer to the more recent statements in those 
cases (http://www.conservatives.com/~/media/Files/Green%20Papers/Rebuilding-Security.ashx?dl=true). 
5 1990 is the reference year used in the Kyoto Protocol. 
6 http://www.theccc.org.uk/. 
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Figure 1: UK Greenhouse gas emissions since 1990 by various measurement approaches 
 
Note: Bunker emissions refer to emissions from international shipping and aviation departing from the UK. 
Source: Helm et al, 2007. 
 
 
The quest for a stable, single and sufficiently high carbon price  
 
From an economic point of view, the most important policy measure to address climate 
change is imposing a price on greenhouse gas emissions using a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade 
scheme. This forces consumers and businesses rather than governments to figure out the most 
efficient way to achieve a given reduction in emissions using their private knowledge of costs 
and opportunities. 
Thus consumers might choose to consume less of certain products or switch from a petrol-
driven car to an electric vehicle. Businesses might decide to adjust their input mix or seize the 
opportunity and invest in research and development (R&D) to invent new less polluting 
products for which there is now a market. Because a given unit of emissions has the same 
effect on global warming irrespective of where it is emitted, the price imposed on a given unit 
should be the same globally as far as is possible. 
Considering the current state of the global negotiations after the United Nations Climate 
Change Summit in Copenhagen in December 2009, we are still a long way from a globally 
harmonised price. But even within the UK, there is huge variation in the price imposed on 
different units of emissions. 
Figure 2 shows the implied cost per tonne of CO2 for a number of different types of CO2 
emissions by industry. The variation is even wider when other types of emissions are 
considered: for example, residential gas faces no carbon penalty at all.  
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Figure 2: Selected costs per tonne of CO2 (£/tonne of CO2) in the UK 
Via Renew able Obligation for about 10% of electricity supply
Business Sector Coal via reduced Climate Change Levy  Rate
Business Sector Coal full Climate Change Levy  Rate
Business Sector Gas  reduced Climate Change Levy Rate
Business Sector Gas  via the full Climate Change Levy Rate
EUETS 2008 Average
EUETS 2009 Average
0 10 20 30 40 50 60  
Source: author’s calculations based on EU ETS data, DEFRA data 
 
One important argument for differential pricing is that some sectors would suffer in their 
competitiveness since not all countries have such stringent measures. Thus many companies 
enjoyed a reduced Climate Change Levy (CCL)7 under a scheme known as Climate Change 
Agreements (CCA). This explains the difference between the reduced and full rates for gas 
and coal in Figure 2. The most comprehensive econometric evaluation study of the CCL finds 
no support for this argument (Martin et al, 2009).  
Generally, carbon prices in the UK are fairly low. For example, even the highest carbon cost 
reported in Figure 2 of £48 (buyout price under the ‘renewable obligation’ scheme) is only 
about half of the lowest similar scheme in Germany. 
The renewable obligation is a requirement for electricity suppliers to source a fraction of their 
electricity from renewable energy. But instead of actually sourcing renewable energy, they 
can simply pay the government a fixed rate per kWh of electricity, which translates into the 
rate shown in Figure 2 using the carbon emitted on average from non-renewable electricity. 
Germany uses instead a system of ‘feed-in tariffs’ whereby grid operators are required by a 
law to pay renewable energy suppliers a fixed rate for electricity that they supply to the grid. 
This rate varies by type of renewable energy. But even for onshore wind, which receives the 
lowest support, the implied cost per tonne of carbon is around £100. 
The low support rate, coupled with the option of being able to buy out rather than deliver, is 
the likely reason why – despite having some of the best renewable resources in Europe, such 
as wind – the UK is not only lagging far behind other countries in the share of electricity 
sourced from renewables but also behind the relatively modest targets set by the government 
in the past (Figure 3).8  
                                                 
7 The CCL is a key part of the UK government’s efforts to curb business sector emissions. It implies various 
taxes on fuel inputs for businesses and was introduced in 2001. For more details, see Martin et al (2009). 
8 This is not to say that the UK should introduce a German-style feed-in tariff system, which has supported some 
types of renewable generation technologies too excessively (see http://repec.rwi-
essen.de/files/REP_08_040.pdf). 
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Figure 3: Share of electricity produced from wind power in selected countries 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wind_power#cite_note-wwea-0 
 
Another concern about carbon prices is their volatility, in particular, within the European 
Union’s Emissions Trading System (ETS).9  
Figure 4 gives some idea of this uncertainty by reporting the distribution of price estimates 
reported in interviews with almost 800 managers in six European countries.10 Note that while 
the average price is almost £40 per tonne of CO2, the 90th percentile price expectation is 
more than three times that of the 10th percentile. 
The problem with such uncertainty is that an efficient response to climate change requires 
huge sunk investments, both in R&D but also in fixed assets such as new power generation 
plants. Private investors will rationally respond to this uncertainty by delaying investment 
and innovation decisions.11 Reducing uncertainty of the price signal should be an important 
part of climate change policy-making. 
 
There are at least three elements to this volatility: 
 
• First, narrow carbon market uncertainty – that is, uncertainty about the carbon needs 
and behaviour of other carbon market participants. 
 
• Second, uncertainty about the wider economic environment – for example, the 
business cycle, oil prices etc. 
 
• And third, uncertainty over the entire future direction of climate change policy. 
 
While wider economic volatility cannot be easily influenced by the government, the other 
types of volatility are directly under its remit. In particular, carbon market uncertainty would 
almost disappear completely if instead of using a carbon trading system, the government 
simply imposed a carbon tax. To reduce uncertainty over future climate change policy, 
government credibility is important so legally binding targets, the Committee on Climate 
Change and cross-party support are all helpful. 
 
                                                 
9 Figure 2 gives a flavour of this by showing that the average price for 2008 was almost 50% higher than for 
2009.  
10 This is based on the study reported in more detail in Anderson et al (2010). 
11 CEP research shows large "delay" effects of uncertainty on investment and R&D (e.g., Bloom et al, 2007). 
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Providing direct funding for particularly large and fixed elements of the required investments 
– for example, investments in electricity grid infrastructure – similarly send a signal of policy 
commitment to the private sector.  
A more radical idea12 to reduce uncertainty is for the government to issue options contracts 
that can be exercised if certain elements of climate change legislation are not enacted or the 
price of carbon drops below a certain level.  
 
Figure 4: Carbon price expectations by European industry in 2020 
 
Source: 800 managers were asked to estimate what they expected the price of carbon to be in 2020. Author’s 
calculations based on CEP’s climate change management interviews 
 
In the proposals of all the main parties, there are statements suggesting that a carbon price is 
an important element of climate change policy-making. In the case of Labour, this is confined 
to support for the EU’s ETS as well as maintaining the CCL in its current form. 
Both the LibDems and the Conservatives13 go further in that they want to reform the CCL 
into a genuine carbon tax – that is, with the tax rate set in relation to the carbon content of 
energy fuels – and to use the CCL as a tool to create a floor price for carbon to the extent that 
the EU ETS does not deliver a meaningful price. 
The Conservatives want to maintain, however, the current exemption of the non-business 
energy consumption from the CCL as well as the exemptions granted under the CCA. The 
LibDems are suggesting removing these exemptions. The LibDems’ plans would therefore go 
furthest in establishing a more homogenous carbon price. Both LibDems and Conservatives 
stop short, however, of announcing what the floor price path would be or how exactly it 
would be determined. So it remains an open question whether any of these plans would 
establish a carbon price high enough to induce change. 
There is broad support across the parties for direct government support in expanding the 
electricity grid – to make it more accessible for far off renewable power locations – as well as 
transforming it into a ‘smart grid’, easing the demand-side balancing of more volatile 
renewable electricity supply. As argued above, such measures can be a helpful, signalling 
                                                 
12 Neuhoff and Ismer (2009), Mainelli and Onstwedder (2009). 
13 As detailed in ‘Rebuilding Security – Conservative Energy Policy for an Uncertain World’ 
(http://www.conservatives.com/~/media/Files/Green%20Papers/Rebuilding-Security.ashx?dl=true). 
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long-term government commitment for a specific policy path, thereby reducing avoidable 
uncertainty. 
 
 
Selling climate change policy to voters 
 
The prime driver for climate change policy is to mitigate the risk of costs of the order of 20% 
of GDP or more14 arising within the next five to ten decades by spending a much smaller cost 
today. The fundamental problem with this is that the people who are supposed to incur that 
smaller cost today are not the same ones who are going to benefit in the future. 
The parties are therefore motivating their push for climate change policies by suggesting that 
the UK can benefit even in the short run by becoming a global leader in clean technologies 
and reaping growth and employment benefits from selling those technologies to the rest of 
the world. How likely is this? 
 
• First, there is a lot of competition for this global leader position, and the UK is 
coming rather late to the game as Figure 5 shows. In terms of patents in clean 
technologies, the UK is currently in sixth position, with innovators from countries 
such as Germany, Japan or the United States holding more than three times as many 
patents as UK innovators. Worse, when looking only at the more recent period 2002-
07, the UK is even falling behind China and South Korea. 
 
• Second, even if UK innovators are ahead in some technologies, it is not clear that this 
will lead to dramatic employment or productivity gains for the UK. Manufacturing of 
those technologies might still take place elsewhere.  
 
• Third, employment and growth in clean technology areas, while good for people 
specialised in these areas, does not necessarily imply welfare gains – in the short run 
– for the population as a whole or relative to a scenario where perhaps other new 
sectors15 would have grown much faster. Politicians therefore need to be careful in 
overselling green growth arguments as it might lead to a backlash against climate 
change policies if these promises do not materialise. 
 
An even more fundamental question concerns the overall effectiveness of climate change 
policy considering that emerging economics such as India and China may not curb emissions. 
Since the UK is only responsible for about 2% of global emissions, unilateral policies will 
have little influence if others do not follow suit. 
One important channel that allows the UK to punch above its carbon weight is again 
technology. The adoption of climate change policies will not only reduce UK pollution but 
also induce innovation in clean technologies.16 To the extent that this makes those 
technologies cheaper or more user-friendly, it also facilitates their introduction to emerging 
economies. While this entails the possibility of a net cost for UK voters in the short run, it 
                                                 
14 According to the Stern Review (2007). 
15 For example, biotechnology. 
16Although not necessarily for UK innovators or to the net short-term benefit of UK residents as argued earlier. 
Related to this, see Dechezleprêtre (2009), which shows that climate change policy in one country can have as 
much of an effect on foreign innovators as on domestic ones.  
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could be justified on the grounds of historical responsibility and the greater current 
capabilities of rich countries such as the UK. 
 
Figure 5: Share of clean energy patents 
 
Note: the figure reports the average share in patents across 15 climate change related technology categories 
Source: Dechezleprêtre and Martin (2010) 
 
Another important concern for political feasibility is the distributional consequences of 
climate change policies. It is well established that carbon prices on their own have a 
regressive effect because the spending of lower income groups implicitly contains more 
carbon.17 A related concern is that carbon-pricing schemes are perceived as yet another 
government scheme to extract money from taxpayers. To address both concerns, additional 
revenue from carbon pricing should be channelled back into the economy in a revenue-
neutral and progressive way – that is, so that lower income groups benefit more. 
While current carbon pricing revenues are by and large revenue-neutral, they are not 
necessarily progressive. The revenue from the CCL is used to lower employers’ national 
insurance contribution as well as to fund a number of energy efficiency programmes that the 
government is running. 
Within the EU’s ETS, emissions permits have so far been by and large handed out for free to 
the most carbon-intensive businesses, rather than auctioned so that taxpayers could benefit. 
Despite the European Commission’s stated to goal to auction most permits, free allocation of 
a large share of the permits will continue for the foreseeable future under current plans.18 
The UK political parties discuss the regressive implications of carbon pricing under the 
heading of ‘fuel poverty’. To address it, they propose a variety of measures focused on 
making the homes of low-income groups more energy efficient. These range from outright 
grants (for example, the government’s Warm Front Programme) and subsidised credit 
schemes for energy efficiency improvements (for example, the Conservatives’ ‘Just do it’ 
Scheme or the LibDems’ Energy Mortgages) to obligations for energy suppliers to ensure 
                                                 
17 See, for example, Grainger and Kolstad (2009). 
18 See Martin et al (2010) for details. 
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installation of a certain amount of energy saving measures among energy customers (a 
scheme currently dubbed Carbon Emission Reduction Target, CERT).19  
Generally these schemes appear very bureaucratic with considerable effort by government to 
establish who is qualified and which measures qualify. There are also concerns that these 
programmes target the wrong people.20 
Moreover, these schemes can only address adverse effects related to direct energy 
consumption. But the regressive effects of carbon prices operate equally through the carbon 
content of the goods that low-income groups consume. As carbon pricing policies become 
more stringent, it would therefore seem necessary to have schemes in place that more broadly 
and more simply ensure revenue neutrality as well as correction of distributional effects. A 
very simple and effective measure could be to re-distribute directly any revenues in the form 
of a uniform fixed rebate – that is, akin to a ‘poll subsidy’.21  
 
 
Supporting technology and innovation 
 
If supporting clean technology is a key objective of climate change policy, are there lessons 
for policy design? From an economic point of view, a stable and sufficiently high carbon 
price is the best instrument. High prices induce upfront R&D investments and allow 
businesses rather than bureaucrats to choose the best way to get green technologies.  
Some evidence that stringent carbon pricing is likely to work comes from the much higher 
rates of clean innovation during the oil price hikes of the early 1980s (see Figure 6).22 In 
addition, directly subsidising R&D is justified on the grounds that there are spillovers 
associated with an innovation – that is, benefits arising from the innovation for which the 
innovator is not rewarded appropriately. 
Another motivation for measures beyond the carbon price could be credit constraints, that is, 
where firms or individuals cannot pursue a high value innovation because they cannot obtain 
the necessary credit; importantly, not because the innovation is not promising but because 
creditors have difficulty establishing the potential of the innovation.  
                                                 
19 This legislation is the driving force behind the eagerness of a wide range of companies and charities to give 
away energy saving light bulbs for free. 
20 See the evaluation of the Warm Front Programme by the National Audit Office 
(http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0809/the_warm_front_scheme.aspx). 
21 Hence unlike Mrs Thatcher’s plans for a poll tax, which would have been very regressive, a poll subsidy 
would give lower income groups a larger fraction of their income back, thereby acting progressively. 
22 See Popp (2002) for more systematic evidence. 
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Figure 6: Clean innovation and energy prices 
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Source: Dechezleprêtre and Martin (2010). 
 
Factors such as these would suggest that any such funding should be channelled to basic 
research and areas where knowledge spillovers and credit constraints are more likely to arise. 
A glance at the project portfolio of the Energy Technology Institute, the main government 
outlet for such research money, would suggest that this is not the case at the moment.23 
Another concern is that there is not much evidence that knowledge spillovers or credit 
constraints are more of an issue for clean technologies than other technologies. The question 
therefore arises why it is necessary to create new institutions that specifically deal with 
research funding in this area rather than channelling such funding through established 
channels. 
All parties express the goal of being technology-neutral when it comes to supporting new 
clean technologies. Despite this stated objective, there appears to be quite a bit of technology 
tinkering in the proposals. The Labour government has recently introduced the ‘banding’ of 
the renewable obligation, implying that different technology types attract different amounts 
of ‘renewable obligation certificates’ per unit of supplied electricity. 
The Conservatives are now following the LibDems in their plans to abandon the renewable 
obligation scheme altogether and to replace it with a system of feed-in tariffs – that is, a 
guaranteed price for renewable electricity supplied to the grid that is above normal market 
prices. Similar to the banding introduced by Labour, different types of technology would 
attract different feed-in tariff rates. 
Either scheme implies that different types of renewable technology get different levels of 
support per kWh of electricity produced, depending on what the government deems a more 
established as opposed to an emerging technology. Such differentiation is unhelpful in that it 
makes it more difficult to establish which technologies are actually the cheapest, it leads to 
misallocation of investments and it creates special interests that are likely to lobby for 
prolonged support of those special handouts.  
                                                 
23 http://www.energytechnologies.co.uk. 
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The same holds for plans put forward by all parties to introduce more generous feed-in tariffs 
for small-scale renewable electricity production (for example, via rooftop solar panels). Any 
bureaucratic barriers that make it difficult for small-scale suppliers to connect to the grid 
should be removed. But providing them with an implicit subsidy higher than for other 
renewable types is likely to lead to unnecessary additional costs. 
 
 
Nuclear power – a dividing line between the parties 
 
A major difference between the main parties’ proposal on electricity generation technologies 
concerns the treatment of nuclear. Both Labour and the Conservatives support new nuclear 
power plants whereas the LibDems categorically oppose the nuclear option. In principle, 
there is no need for governments to be either in favour or against nuclear as long they create a 
level playing field relative to other generation technologies without government subsidies, 
which nuclear attracted plentifully in the past. 
Labour and the Conservatives pay lip service to this idea. But there are several aspects 
affecting the costs of nuclear generation potentially creating implicit hidden subsidies that 
still have to be addressed. The first is the question of nuclear waste, where the government 
has not yet worked out a long-term strategy for underground storage of such waste. Costs 
arising from this would need to be fully borne by the operators of any new nuclear plants. 
The second is the question of liability in case of a major accident in a nuclear installation. It 
appears that the UK has a rather lax approach by limiting operator liability at a low level 
compared with other countries, which often impose unlimited liability and more stringent 
requirements on securing these obligations (see Table 1). This would render costs of nuclear 
lower for the operators than they are in reality. 
Besides keeping the costs between different renewable generation technologies level – that is, 
within the power sector – it would also be advisable for efficiency and transparency to 
equalise the carbon costs between the power sector and other sectors of the economy. Thus, 
rather than creating a separate system, such as either the renewable obligation or a feed-in 
tariff, clean generation technologies could derive their support from a reformed and vastly 
more stringent24 CCL as discussed above. 
To minimise uncertainty, such a tax could be designed to guarantee a minimum price for the 
main fossil energy carriers, that is, coal and gas. Thus the government would guarantee25 that 
the gas price after carbon tax would never drop beyond a certain level.26  
To fine-tune this policy, a body such as the Climate Change Committee could tighten the 
guaranteed level over time if the initially suggested level turns out to be insufficient to meet 
the challenges. Such a policy – where the carbon tax target is linked to the price of fossil 
fuels – would not only hedge against general uncertainty in fossil fuel markets but also 
against deliberate attempts of fossil fuel producers to sabotage climate policy by price 
                                                 
24 That is, on the order of £40 or more per tonne of CO2 rather than £6 as it is now. 
25 Potentially by issuing appropriate option contracts (See footnote 13). 
26 Indexing the carbon price to the fossil fuel price would also address recent concerns about excess profits for 
renewable operators in the event of oil price hikes (see Ofgem: 
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Media/PressRel/Documents1/16662-R5.pdf). 
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reductions.27 Of course as discussed above, any proceeds from such a tax should be 
channelled back to taxpayers in a revenue-neutral way. 
 
Table 1: Operator liability in case of a nuclear accident in various countries 
 
 
 
Risking competitiveness and jobs? 
 
Strong unilateral climate change policy entails the risk that firms might shift production to 
jurisdictions without such regulation, thereby leading to job loss. This would also jeopardise 
the objective of inducing innovation: rather than inventing new technology, firms simply use 
the old technologies abroad. 
Anderson et al (2010) examine the likelihood of downsizing or outsourcing arising from 
climate change policies, and find very few sectors where this is a big problem. What’s more, 
compared with other major European economies such as France or Germany, this risk 
appears lower in the UK.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
There is a great deal of overlap between the parties’ proposals on climate change policy. The 
2008 Climate Change Bill, which was backed by the opposition parties, has created a sensible 
overarching framework for climate change policy-making. This framework must now be 
filled with more detailed policy measures that can induce change. 
From an economic point of view, it is central that a uniform, sufficiently high and predictable 
carbon price signal is established. Through a variety of policies, usage of carbon and other 
greenhouse gases is already costly to emit in the UK. But these prices differ greatly 
depending on where such emissions occur. There is also much uncertainty over what these 
carbon costs will be in years to come. 
There is some sensitivity in the parties’ proposals to these issues, particularly with the 
Conservative and LibDem plans to reform the Climate Change Levy into a genuine carbon 
tax and use it to hedge against uncertainty in the European Union’s Emissions Trading 
Scheme. The LibDems’ plans – to extend the levy to the non-business sector and crack down 
                                                 
27 See Sinn (2007) for a discussion. 
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on various other exemptions currently granted – are most comprehensive proposal to create a 
homogenous carbon price. Both parties are stopping short, however, of specifying how high 
this floor price should be. 
The parties should be careful in overselling the short-run benefits in terms of job creation and 
growth from climate change policies. 
All parties have proposals for differential treatment of different ‘clean’ generation 
technologies. Labour and the Conservatives support further nuclear power plants whereas the 
LibDems are opposed to nuclear. Giving differential support to different technologies risks 
inefficiencies and unnecessary costs.  
Rather than creating a separate system, demand-side support for renewable technologies 
could be integrated with wider efforts to establish a carbon price. The suggested price floor 
for carbon could be indexed to fossil fuel prices, both to hedge the risk for the ‘clean’ 
technology and generation industry and avoid excessive profits in the event of future oil price 
hikes. 
Any meaningful carbon price will be fiscally regressive unless accompanied by compensating 
measures. The current plans of the parties lack practical proposals to address this. The 
simplest measure could be to channel all revenue arising from carbon back to UK residents in 
form of a lump sum rebate – akin to a ‘poll subsidy’. 
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